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CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS

LIFTING THE SUPREME COURT'S THUMB OFF
OF THE SCALE: PROMOTING
TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENTREPRENEURIAL
INNOVATION, WHILE PROTECTING THE
INTERESTS OF COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AFTER
MGM V. GROKSTER
I. INTRODUCTION

"Technology. . . brings you great gifts with one hand, and it
stabs you in the back with the other."1
Over the years, society has become accustomed to numerous
inventions that are used in daily life. Many of which have been
brought by the proliferation in computer technology over the last
twenty years.2 Technology gets better all the time, thus raising
policy concerns about the purposes for which it is used.' Some
inventions make it easier to infringe upon copyrights, which could
hinder society from benefiting from artistic creations over the
1. Anthony Lewis, Dear Scoop Jackson, NY TIMES, Mar. 15, 1971 (citing CP
Snow).
2. See Mary Bellis, Microsoft Corporation, Part 1: The Dawn of Windows
(2005), at http://inventors.about.com/library/weekly/aa080499.htm (noting that
Microsoft shipped Windows 1.0, [the first version of the Windows Operating
System], on November 20, 1985").
3. Tech,
Telecom,
and
Internet,
CATO
INSTITUTE,
at
http://www.cato.org/tech/univservice.html (Nov. 19, 2005) ("The bottom line is:
things are getting better all the time. The real question policy makers should be
debating is not how to ensure Americans have a PC and Internet access, it's
what they expect Americans to do with these technologies once they have

them.").
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long-run because artists will not have the incentive to create if
their works can be easily copied at a mass scale. The music and
movie industries have been concerned in recent years about filesharing programs that allow users to share music and movie files
effortlessly over the Internet.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios v. Grokster4 is a victory for copyright holders, but it also
raises questions about what the future holds. Specifically, the
Supreme Court adopted a new theory of liability for secondary
infringers,5 but the minimum amount of evidence that a plaintiff
will have to show in order to hold a defendant secondarily liable
under the new inducement theory remains uncertain.
More
importantly, after Grokster, there is an apparent disagreement
among the Court as to what type of evidence is sufficient under the
Sony standard, which directly affects how much evidence is
necessary to show that a party's product has "substantial noninfringing uses" so that it can escape contributory infringement
6
liability.
Part II of this article provides a historical overview of filesharing and sets forth the important concepts of balancing interests
between inventors and copyright holders, and the law of secondary
liability. Furthermore, it explains the Grokster decision, including
the concurring opinions. It also outlines key cases involving
secondary liability and the Sony rule leading up to the Court's
adoption of the inducement theory of liability. Part III examines
how courts and parties will approach such liability after the
Grokster decision. Moreover, it explores the impact that Grokster
4. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764
(2005).
5. Id. at 2780 ("[H]olding that one who distributes a device with the object
of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third parties.").
6. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984) (holding that under the staple article of commerce doctrine, "the sale of
copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not
constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial
non[-]infringing uses").
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will have through an examination of a pending secondary liability
case and a hypothetical scenario. International issues involving
file-sharing and secondary liability are also addressed in order to
illustrate that there is a movement for international enforcement of
file-sharing copyright infringement, and to demonstrate the global
importance that U.S. decisions, such as Grokster, have on the
international community.
This article suggests that it is premature to introduce legislation
to guide inducement cases, but it is an absolute necessity that
legislation be adopted that resolves the disagreement among the
Supreme Court in the application of the Sony rule because such
legislation is directly granted to Congress in the Constitution.
Finally, it suggests that in the realm of file-sharing, Congress
should impose requirements on file-sharing companies to
implement mechanisms to minimize copyright infringement so that
such technology can thrive, while protecting copyright holders
from getting injured.

II. BACKGROUND
A. HistoricalOverview of File-Sharing
In 1987, the Fraunhofer Institut Integrierte Schaltungen research
center, part of a German company called Fraunhofer Gesellschaft,
began a project called "EUREKA project EU147."7 The purpose
of the project was to research "high quality, low bit-rate audio
coding."8 Fraunhofer obtained a German patent for the resulting
technology of the EUREKA project in April 1989.' The Moving
Picture Expert Group ("MPEG") eventually set this as the standard
for digital audio recording storage. 10 The format was called
7. Mary
Bellis,
The
History
of
MP3
(2005),
at
http://inventors.about.com/od/mstartinventions/a/MPThree.htm.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that the "Moving Picture Experts Group set a standard file format
for the storage of audio recordings in a digital format called MPEG-3,
abbreviated as 'MP3.').
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MPEG-3, commonly abbreviated as "MP3."" Fraunhofer received
a United States patent for the MP3 format on November 26,
1996.12 These digital audio files are created through a process
known as "ripping."' 3 This process allows a computer user to
extract audio files from a compact disc ("CD") onto a computer's
hard drive, thereby compressing the digital audio data from the CD
into MP3 format. 14 This process allows substantially more audio
files to be stored using less memory. 5 In addition, MP3
technology has inspired innovation and created an entirely new
market for music players 6 to utilize the MP3 audio files to their
full potential. 7 It has also increased the ease at which music is
sold to consumers. For example, iTunes is an online music store
that allows people to download MP3s at the click of a button for a
11. Id.
12. Bellis, supra note 7.
13. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011.
14. Id.

15. See Bellis, supra note 7 (noting that Fraunhofer Gesellschaft stated:
Without Data reduction, digital audio signals typically consist
of 16 bit samples recorded at a sampling rate more than twice
the actual audio bandwidth (e.g., 44.1 kHz for Compact
Discs). So you end up with more than 1.400 Mbit to represent
just one second of stereo music in CD quality. By using
MPEG audio coding, you may shrink down the original sound
data from a CD by a factor of 12, without losing sound
quality).
16. Id. (noting that portable MP3 players began to appear in 1999); see also
Maya Roney, Apple Could Ship More Than 37 Million IPods In 2005, at
http://www.forbes.com/markets/bonds/2005/ 11/01/apple-ipod-computer1101marketsl3.html (November 1, 2005) (noting that by the end of the 2005,
Apple will have shipped 37 million iPods, which is a portable hard-drive based
MP3 player).
17. Compare Bellis, supra note 7
(In the early 1990s, Frauenhofer developed the first, however,
unsuccessful MP3 player. In 1997, developer Tomislav
Uzelac of Advanced Multimedia Products invented the AMP
MP3 Playback Engine, the first successful MP3 player. Two
university students, Justin Frankel and Dmitry Boldyrev
ported AMP to Windows and created Winamp. In 1998,
Winamp became a free MP3 music player boosting the
success of MP3. No licensing fees are required to use an MP3
player.).
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mere ninety-nine cents each." In fact, some artists are entering
agreements with iTunes to sell their music from their own websites
in conjunction with the iTunes service.' 9 Paid music services like
this and portable MP3 players are making the digital music market
a common consumer experience. 2 '
This growing market is
2
expected to continue at a rapid rate. '
Although the MP3 format has enhanced the way that people
listen to music, it has also increased the ease at which people can
infringe valid copyrights. New technologies that have spawned
from the MP3 format help facilitate MP3 transfer from one party
to another. Specifically, file-sharing programs allow users to
18. See
All
Your
Greatest
Hits
(2005),
at
http://www.apple.com/itunes/music/
([The iTunes Music Store is open] 24/7 on Macs and
Windows PCs.. .with music fans purchasing over 600 million
songs worldwide to date. Featuring more than 2 million songs
from major music companies, independent labels and
individual artists alike.. .For just [ninety-nine cents] each, you
get high-quality AAC music files that won't disappear at the
end of the month, or ever.).
19. Online Interview with David Shayman, CEO, Disco D Productions, LLC
(Nov. 9, 2005); see also Bill "Low-Key" Heinzelman, Disco D: Defying
Convention, at http://discod.com/2005/index.php?
option=comcontent&task=view&id=48&Itemid=2 (April 9, 2005); David
Shayman,
Disco
D
Biography,
at
http://discod.com/2005/index.php?option-comcontent&task=view&id= 1 9&Ite
mid=45 (Feb. 15, 2005) (David Shayman, aka Disco D, has an agreement with
iTunes in which he will distribute his music through iTunes on his all-digital
label called "Disco Digital."
Those that want to buy Disco D music will
eventually be able to go to his website, www.discod.com, which will directly
link users to the iTunes store. Disco D, a graduate of the University of
Michigan, has produced tracks for 50 Cent ("Ski Mask Way" from "The
Massacre"), Nina Sky, Sara Stokes, and Kevin Federline (due out in 2006)).
20. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764,
2796 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Ashton, {Int'l Fed'n of the
Phonographic Indus.} Predicts Downloads Will Hit the Mainstream, MUSIC
WEEK, Jan. 29, 2005, at 6)).
21. Id. ("[G]lobal digital revenues will likely exceed $3 billion in 2010.")
(citing
Press
Release,
Informa
Media
Group
Report,
at
http://www.informatm.com; F. Oberholzer & K. Strumpf, The Effect of File
Sharing
on
Record
Sales:
An
Empirical
Analysis,
at
www.unc.ed/cigar/papers/FileSharingMarch2004.pdf (Mar. 2004)).
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transfer MP3 files from one computer to another over the
Internet." File-sharing technology, however, has changed over
time. Such progressive technological innovation is likely due, in
part, to legal controversy over one developer's technology, which
then gives another developer incentive to create a similar
technology that will avoid some of the features that led to the first
developer's legal dispute.23
The first type of technology that was developed to facilitate file
transfers was Napster. That technology utilized central servers,
which were computers that Napster used to index the files that
were available on Napster users' computers.24 While Napster was
found secondarily liable for copyright infringement for providing
the indices on their central server,25 other companies were given
incentive to innovate to provide similar services without falling
under the Napster ruling. Companies such as Kazaa, Grokster, and
StreamCast began to offer services that were similar to Napster,
but were different because the search function was decentralized,
allowing computers to communicate directly with each other.26
This structure became known as a peer-to-peer ("P2P") network
and offered many advantages over the centralized system.27
22. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
23. See id. at 1012 (noting that "the names of MP3 files [were] uploaded

from

the user's computer to the Napster

servers,"

thereby directly

communicating with Napster's central server); See also Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at
2770 (explaining that peer-to-peer file networks do not communicate through
central servers, but instead user's computers communicate directly with one
another).
24. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480) [hereinafter Writ of
Certiorari].
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2770
(Because they need no central computer server to mediate the
exchange of information or files among users, the high-

bandwidth communications capacity for a server may be
dispensed with, and the need for costly server storage space is
eliminated. Since copies of a file (particularly a popular one)
are available on many users' computers, file requests and
retrievals may be faster than on other types of networks, and
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Instead of storing the indices on a central mainframe, they were
stored on individual computers, and a search for particular files
would scan the individual users' computers. 8 While Napster
offered only music files, these other services expanded offerings to
video games, motion pictures, and other digital media. 9
1. Napster: Centralized
Napster used file-sharing technology to allow its software users
to "(1) make MP3 music files stored on individual computer hard
drives available for copying by other Napster users; (2) search for
MP3 music files stored on the other users' computers; and (3)
transfer exact copies of the contents of other users' MP3 files from
one computer to another via the Internet. ' 3' After downloading the
Napster software, creating a username and password, and saving
MP3s in a "user library" file on a computer, "the names of MP3
files [were] uploaded from the user's computer to the Napster
servers," but the "content of the MP3 file remain[ed] stored in the
user's computer."'" The names were stored on Napster's server in
a "collective directory," and were listed when the user logged into
the Napster system.32 Napster users could search the collective
directory for song names and artists, and would receive a list of
file names from Napster's collective directory.3 3 In addition, users
could save other user names using a "hotlist" function which
would notify the user when those listed in his hotlist were also
logged into the server.34 This allowed users to track who they had
downloaded songs from in the past.3 5 When a song was requested

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

since file exchanges do not travel through a server,
communications can take place between any computers that
remain connected to the network without risk that a glitch in
the server will disable the network in its entirety.).
Writ of Certiorari,supra note 24, at 6.
Id.
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1011-12.
Id. at 1012.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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for download, the Napster server would facilitate the connection of
the requesting user's computer to the host user's computer to
transfer the MP3 file between the two; hence, the term "peer-topeer."36
2. Grokster and StreamCast:Decentralized
Similar to Napster, services like Grokster and StreamCast
Networks distributed free software that would allow users to share
electronic files.37
In contrast to Napster, however, users'
computers shared files directly between their computers without
the use of a central server. 38 This type of technology eliminated
the need for costly storage space on a central server, and allowed
for the exchange of files over a high-bandwidth communication
between computers. 39
Grokster and StreamCast each used slightly different
technologies. 0
Grokster, on one hand, used "FastTrack"
technology, which gave computers an indexing capacity and
designated them a "supernode."' StreamCast, on the other hand,
used software called "Morpheus," which relied on "Gnutella"
technology.42 Under Grokster's protocol, when a user searched for
a particular file, the request was sent to computers with designated
supernodes, and a search of the index on that computer was
conducted, which in turn would send the request to other
supernodes.43 If the file was located, the supernode would disclose
its location to the requesting computer, which could then
download the requested file directly from the host computer.44
Once the file was copied to the requesting computer, it was stored
in a designated sharing folder, and was made available to users to
36. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1012.
37. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764,
2770 (2005).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Seeid. at2771.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2771.
44. Id.
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download, along with other files in that folder.45
StreamCast's Gnutella technology operated similarly to
FastTrack technology, but some versions did not use supernodes.4 6
When supemodes were not used, computers communicated
directly with each other.47 For instance, the Morpheus software
sent a user's search request to connected computers, which passed
that search along to other connected peers.48 The search results
were relayed back to the requesting computer, at which time the
user could download files directly from the host computers.4 9
Unlike Napster, the information that was transferred did not pass
through central servers."0
B. Balancing Interests and Secondary Liability
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides that: "Congress
shall have Power... to Promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.""
This grants a limited monopoly to authors and inventors. 2 The
Constitution assigns Congress with the task of determining the
scope of this limited monopoly in order to provide the public with
access to the work of inventors and authors. 3 To accomplish this
task, Congress must balance "the interests of authors and inventors
in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries"
with "society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas,
information, and commerce."5 4 In a constant struggle to meet an
appropriate balance, Congress has amended the patent and

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2771.
50. See id.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
52. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
n.10 (1984).
53. Id. at 429.
54. Id.
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copyright statutes repeatedly."
Although the Constitution only imposes liability on those that
are direct copyright infringers,56 courts have developed theories
that impose secondary liability on those who are not directly
infringing a copyright." Until MGM v. Grokster, 8 there were two
theories under which secondary liability could be found vicarious liability and contributory infringement."
Vicarious
liability can be imposed when a party "has both (1) the right and
ability to supervise a direct infringer [and] (2) a financial interest
in the infringement."6 Contributory infringement is found when a
defendant "with knowledge of infringing activity, induces, causes
or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another . "61
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the
Supreme Court found that the sale of articles in commerce,
including the sale of copying equipment, was not contributory
infringement if the product is "widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes," and need only be capable of substantial
non-infringing uses.62 The Sony rule limited the imputation of
culpable intent from the uses or characteristics of a distributed
product,63 and found that a manufacturer was not liable solely on
the basis of distribution.64 In Grokster, the Supreme Court adopted

55. Id.
56. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th
Cir. 2001) (noting that to establish a prima facie case for direct copyright
infringement, a plaintiff must prove (1) that they owned the allegedly infringed
material and (2) that the "alleged infringers violate[d] at least one exclusive
right granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. § 106").
57. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS, § 9.4 (1st ed. 2003)
[hereinafter SCHECHTER & THOMAS].
58. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764

(2005).
59. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 57.
60. E.g., id.
61. E.g., id. (citing Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc.,
443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
62. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984).
63. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2779.
64. Id. at 2777.
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the inducement theory of liability, under which courts will
consider direct evidence of a party's encouragement to induce
others to use its products to infringe copyrights.65
C. Supreme CourtAdopts the Inducement Rule: Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005)

1. Majority Opinion:Justice Souter

a. FindingofFact
After a brief explanation of how the Grokster and StreamCast
systems operated, the Court examined the findings of fact. First, it
noted that although those companies did not know what files were
copied due to the P2P nature of their software, searches using their
software would easily reveal what was available on their
networks.66 For example, a statistician that MGM commissioned
conducted a study revealing that nearly 90% of the files on the
FastTrack network were copyrighted works.67 It was also noted, in
comparison, that 87% of the files on the Napster network were
copyrighted.68 Although MGM's statistical evidence did not
demonstrate how often files were downloaded, it suggested that
the majority of downloads constituted acts of infringement.6 9 The
fact that millions of copies of software had been downloaded, and
billions of files had been shared, demonstrated the alarming scope
of copyright infringement.7"
65. Id. at 2780 ("For the same reasons that Sony took the [staple article]
doctrine of patent law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the

inducement rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright.").
66. Id. at 2772.
67. Id.
68. Id. n.5 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1013

(9th Cir. 2001)).
69. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2772.

70. Id. (noting that "well over 100 million copies of the software in question
are known to have been downloaded, and billions of files are shared across the
FastTrack and Gnutella networks each month").
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The Court explained that Grokster and SteamCast "took active
steps to encourage infringement." 7 ' When Napster was sued, for
example, StreamCast released a program called "OpenNap," which
allowed users to download files from Napster and other OpenNap
users, thereby targeting old Napster users.72 In fact, it used its
OpenNap network to release copies of Morpheus, and internal
company documents demonstrated that Streamcast wanted to
attract former Napster users if that network was shut down due to
the lawsuit against Napster.73 In addition, StreamCast promoted
itself on its network as a company "which is similar to what
Napster was. 74 In addition, a company executive sent an internal
e-mail that stated:
We have put this network in place so that when
Napster pulls the plug on their free service... or if
the Court orders them shut down prior to that. . .we
will be positioned to capture the flood of their 32
million users that will be actively looking for an
alternative.75
Subsequently,
StreamCast
put
together
promotional
advertisements that portrayed its service as a Napster alternative.76
Although these advertisements were never actually released to the
public, the Court noted that they clearly illustrated StreamCast's
intent.77
In comparison, Grokster launched software called
"Swaptor," which was similar to OpenNap, but placed digital
codes into its websites so that when computer users searched for
"Napster" or "free file-sharing" on Internet search engines, they
would be directed to Grokster's website, where the Grokster

71. Id.
72. Id. at 2772-73.
73. Id. at 2773.
74. Id.
75. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2773.
76. Id. (noting that one such advertisement read: "Napster Inc. has
announced that it will soon begin charging you a fee. That's if the courts don't
order it shut down first. What will you do to get around it?").
77. Id. at 2773 n.7.
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software was available for download.7"
Furthermore, other evidence showed that StreamCast executives
kept track of the amount of commercial artists that were available
on their networks, and an internal communication illustrated that
one of StreamCast's goals was to have more copyrighted songs on
their system than other file-sharing networks.79 In addition,
Morpheus allowed its users to search for "Top 40" songs, which
most certainly were copyrighted.8" Likewise, Grokster sent its
users newsletters that promoted its service's capability of
providing certain, popular copyrighted materials.8'
Moreover, the business model of each company confirmed that
their objective was for users to utilize their service to download
copyrighted works.82 Since each company's software was free for
download on the Internet, their income was generated from the
sale of advertising space, where such advertisements were
streamed to users' computer as searches were being performed.8 3
Economically, as the number of users on each network increased,
so did the value of advertising opportunities.84 The Court noted
that the evidence demonstrated that the services were used
primarily for free access to copyrighted work, despite the fact that
non-copyrighted work was also available on the networks.85
Lastly, the Court explained that neither company made any
attempts to stop users from downloading copyrighted material,
such as through the use of filtering methods or otherwise.8 6
Although Grokster sent e-mails warning its users about copyright
infringing conduct, it never attempted to block anyone from using

78. Id.
79. Id. at 2773-74.
80. Id. at 2774; Compare In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation, 252 F. Supp.
2d 634, 644 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (noting that Aimster users were presented with a
list of "The Aimster Top-40," which was "a list of the 40 'hot new releases'
most frequently downloaded by Aimster users").
81. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2774 (citing Brief for Motion Picture Studio and
Recording Company Petitioners 7-8).
82. Id. at 2774.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (noting that there is some demand for free Shakespeare).
86. Id.
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its software to download copyrighted material.87
In fact,
StreamCast refused offers from other companies to help monitor
copyright infringement on its network, and also blocked Internet
Protocol addresses of those that it believed were attempting to
monitor its networks.8" Clearly, StreamCast was blatantly trying to
prevent people from ascertaining information regarding the
copyrighted material that was being shared, thereby contributing to
the encouragement of infringement.

b. A New StandardAdopted-Imputed Intent to Infringe vs.
Direct Evidence of Specific Intent to Infringe
Many of the amici89 were upset with the Court of Appeals in
MGM v. Grokster9 ° for disrupting "a sound balance between the
respective values of supporting creative pursuits through copyright
protection and promoting innovation in new communication
technologies by limiting the incidence of liability for copyright
infringement."9 ' The Supreme Court recognized that the tension
between these two values was the crux of this case.92 Specifically,
copyright infringement must be prevented, but imposing liability
"could limit further development of beneficial technologies."9 3 It
further explained, however, that the breadth of infringing
87. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2774.

88. Id.
89. The amicus briefs filed by the amici, friends of the court, included,

among others, Brief of Amici Curiae Sixty Intellectual Prop. & Tech. Law
Professors and the U.S. Pub. Policy Comm. of the Ass'n for Computing Mach.
in Support of Respondents at 1, Metro Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480); Brief of Amici Curiae Nat'l
Acad. of Recording Arts & Sci. & Am. Fed'n of Musicians of the U.S. and
Canada, The Country Music Ass'n, Inc., The Gospel Music Ass'n, The Hip-Hop

Summit Action Network, Jazz Alliance Int'l, Inc. & The Rhythm & Blues
Found. Supporting the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480).

90. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154
(9th Cir. 2004).
91. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2775.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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downloads makes it extremely difficult to effectively enforce such
infringement against the direct violators - the networks' users.94
These circumstances rendered a powerful argument for imposing
indirect liability given the massive amount of infringing
downloads that occurred daily on these networks.95
First, the Supreme Court addressed the Ninth Circuit's
application of Sony.96

It noted that Sony dealt with secondary

liability for copyright infringement arising from the distribution of
a commercial product, in that case, the Betamax video tape
recorders.97 The Court further explained that the adoption of
contributory liability in Sony was based on the staple article of
commerce doctrine from patent law,98 which was "devised to
identify instances in which it may be presumed from distribution
of an article in commerce that the distributor intended the article to
be used to infringe another's patent, and so may justly be held
liable for that infringement."99 The doctrine adopted in Sony was
based on the premise that there is no injustice in "imputing an
intent to infringe" when an article is not good for anything except
infringement.'00 In contrast, in order to leave "breathing room for
innovation and... vigorous commerce," the Sony rule limited fault
to instances of acute fault, and disdained from finding liability
where a product is capable of substantial lawful uses, as well as
unlawful uses.'
The Court went on to find that the Ninth Circuit misapplied
Specifically, it rejected the Ninth Circuit's broad
Sony.
interpretation of Sony's limitation that a producer of a product can
never be held liable for contributory infringement for third parties'
infringing use of that product whenever it is capable of substantial
lawful use. 0 2 It explained that Sony "barred secondary liability
94. Id. at 2775-76.
95. Id. at 2776.
96. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
97. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2777.
98. Id. (referencing 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(c) (2005)).
99. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2777.
100. Id. (citing Canda v. Michigan Malleable Iron Co., 124 F. 486, 489 (6th
Cir. 1903)).
101. Id. at 2777-78.
102. Id. at 2778.
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based on presuming or imputing intent to cause infringement
solely from the design or distribution of a product capable of
substantial lawful use, which the distributor knows is in fact used
for infringement."' °3 The Ninth Circuit, however, read Sony
broadly and found that even where there was evidence independent
of the distribution and design of the product, such as evidence of
"actual purpose to cause infringing use," liability would not be
imposed "unless the distributors had 'specific knowledge of
infringement at a time at which they contributed to the
infringement, and failed to act upon that information."" 4 The
Ninth Circuit determined that neither Grokster nor StreamCast
could be liable because neither company had specific knowledge
of unlawful uses because there was no central server."°5
The Supreme Court found this analysis erroneous because Sony
was a case about imputed intent rather than liability on a specific
theory. 6 The parties and many amici indicated that the key to
resolving the Sony rule was to determine what it meant for a
product to be "capable of commercially significant non-infringing
uses."'0 7 Despite this argument, however, the Court refused to
revisit Sony further to determine a quantifiable description "of the
point of balance between protection and commerce when liability
rests solely on distribution with knowledge that unlawful use will
occur,"'0 8 leaving that issue for another day.
Moreover, the Court recognized that Sony was based on imputed
intent and did not require that courts ignore instances where there
was evidence of intent.0 9 Specifically, it found that the Sony
staple article rule does not preclude liability when "evidence goes
beyond a product's characteristics or the knowledge that it may be
put to infringing uses" and there is direct evidence of promoting
Referring to the common law of patents, the
infringement."'
Court noted that a distributor has an affirmative intent to have its
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2778.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2779.
Id.
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product used to infringe when there is "[e]vidence of 'active steps
...taken to encourage direct infringement,' such as advertising an
infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use."
...As such, a showing of encouraged infringement "overcomes
the law's reluctance to find liability when a defendant merely sells
a commercial product suitable for some lawful use."'1 12 The Court
thereby adopted patent law's inducement rule for the same reasons
that it adopted the staple article doctrine from patent law in Sony.' 3
Following this rule, it held "that one who distributes a device with
the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by
clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by
third parties." 1 4 The Court explained that the inducement rule is
premised on "purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and
thus does nothing to compromise" the balance of copyright
protection with legitimate commerce and innovation." 5
Based on this newly adopted inducement rule, the Court found
that Grokster and StreamCast intended to encourage copyright
infringement. 6 Specifically, StreamCast advertised its OpenNap
program's compatibility with Napster, while Grokster released an
electronic newsletter advertising that its software could be used to
In addition, both companies
access copyrighted music.17
responded to users' requests for help in finding and playing
copyrighted music, thereby communicating their encouragement of
such use of its software. 8 Furthermore, StreamCast had a
111. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2779 (citing Oak Indus., Inc. v. Zenith Elec.
Corp., 697 F. Supp. 988, 992 (N.D.Ill. 1988)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2780.
114. Id. (noting that the Court is "mindful of the need to keep from trenching
on regular commerce or discouraging development of technologies with lawful
and unlawful potential").
115. Id. (explaining that "mere knowledge of infringing potential or of
actual infringing uses, [like in Sony], would not be enough [in this case] to
subject a distributor to liability, [n]or would ordinary acts incident to product
distribution, such as offering customers technical support or product updates,
support liability in themselves").
116. See id. at 2781-83.
117. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2780.
118. Id.at 2781.
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plethora of internal communications and advertising directed at
Napster users, which illustrated StreamCast's intent regardless of
whether or not any of it was actually used to advertise to the
public. 19
The Supreme Court highlighted three features that most clearly
First, each company
exemplified the companies' intent.
specifically catered its software to the market of former Napster
users, which showed a principal intent to encourage
infringement.'2 ° Second, the companies' unlawful objectives were
further supported by the fact that neither company attempted to
implement filtering systems or other mechanisms to reduce the
Third, since
amount of infringing activity using their software.'
both companies generated money through advertising on their
programs, the degree of advertising revenue was positively
correlated with an increase in the use of the software.' 22 This
contributed to infringement because of the commercial value of
their respective companies was based on high-volume use.' 23
Beyond direct evidence of encouragement, the inducement
theory of liability also requires that there be a showing "of actual
infringement by the recipients of the device," which, in this case,
is the software.'2 4 The Court determined that this element was not
an issue, given that the evidence of infringement was on such a
massive scale.' 25 Based on the substantial evidence that favors the
elements of inducement, the Court found that the lower court's
finding of summary judgment in favor of Grokster and StreamCast

119. Id. (noting such advertisements as "When the lights went off at
Napster... where did the users go?").
120. Id. (noting StreamCast's references to Napster in internal documents, its
advertising of its OpenNap program to Napster user, and its adoption of the
name "Grokster," which was a derivative of the "Napster" name, it offered its
own version of OpenNap, and it attempted to divert Internet queries for Napster
to its own website).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2782.
123. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2782 (noting that this type of "evidence alone
would not justify an inference of unlawful intent, but viewed in the context of
the entire record its import [was] clear").
124. Id.
125. Id.
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12 6
was erroneous, and remanded the case.

D. Actual Knowledge of Specific Infringement: A&M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)
In A &MRecords, Inc. v. NapsterInc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed one of A&M Records'
claims that Napster was contributory liable for copyright
infringement.'27 Liability turned on whether an alleged infringer
had "knowledge of the infringing activity, induce[d], cause[d] or
materially contribute[d] to the infringing conduct of another. 128
The appellate court agreed with the district court, with little
discussion, that Napster provided "the site and facilities" that
enabled direct infringement.'29
The standard for "knowledge" is that the alleged secondary
infringer must "know or have reason to know" of the
infringement. 3 ' The district court determined that Napster had
actual and constructive knowledge that its users shared
copyrighted music.'

The appellate court upheld this decision and

found that Napster's reliance on Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.3 2 was unfounded because "Napster's actual,

specific knowledge of direct infringement render[ed] Sony's
holding of limited assistance to Napster."''

It noted that in Sony,

the requisite level of knowledge was not imputed where the

126. Id. at 2778-83.
127. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir.
2001).
128. Id. (citing Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artist Mgmt., Inc., 443
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
129. Id. at 1022 (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. 76 F.3d 259,
264 (9th Cir. 1996)).
130. Id. at 1020 (citing Cable/Home Communications, Inc. v. Network Prod.,
902 F.2d 829, 845-46 n.29 (11 th Cir. 1990) & Religious Tech. Ctr. V. Netcom
On-Line Communications Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373-74 (N.D. Cal.
1995)).
131. Id.
132. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
133. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020.
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defendants made and distributed a product capable of both
infringing and substantial non-infringing uses. 3 4 Likewise, the
appellate court refused to "impute the requisite level of knowledge
to Napster merely because peer-to-peer file-sharing technology
may be used to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights."' 35 As such, it
rejected the district court's reasoning that Napster failed to show
that its service was capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses.' 36 This result was reached because the district
court ignored Napster's capabilities and improperly limited its
analysis to current uses.'37
The Napster Court noted "that in an online context, evidence of
actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement is required to
hold a computer system operator liable for contributory copyright
infringement."' 38
Finally, it held that Napster knew of and
contributed to direct infringement because it had learned that
specific infringing material was available on its system, it could
have blocked its users' access to such material, and it failed to
39
remove the material. 1
E. Actual Knowledge is Not a Sufficient Condition: In re Aimster
Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003)
The Seventh Circuit was presented with a Napster-like situation
in In re."Aimster Copyright Litigation.4 ° The file-sharing program
in that case used AOL's instant messaging service to facilitate file
transfers.' 4'
All communications over the messaging service,

134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 1020 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 439).
Id. at 1020-21 (referencing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436).
Id. at 1021.
Id. (noting that the Sony Court framed the inquiry as "whether the video

tape recorder is capable of commercially significant non[-]infringing uses"
(emphasis added)).

138. Id. at 1021 (citing Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communications Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).

139. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021-22 (finding, in addition, that Napster was
also liable because it "materially contribute[d] to the infringing activity").
140. In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
141. Id. at 646.
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including the file transfers, were encrypted. 4 ' The court, however,
found that such encryption did not shelter Aimster from liability
because willful blindness constituted knowledge.'43 The Seventh
Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit's view in Napster that "actual
knowledge of specific infringing uses is a sufficient condition for
deeming a facilitator a contributory infringer."' 44 In doing so, it
then addressed the Sony rule to determine whether Aimster was
capable of substantial non-infringing uses.'45 Despite five possible
non-infringing uses that the Seventh Circuit suggested, it explained
that the important question was the probability of such noninfringing uses.'46 The Aimster Court ruled against Aimster
because Aimster did not present evidence that its users' primary
purpose was to transfer non-copyrighted files, and it did not show
other evidence indicating a high probability that Aimster had
substantially non-infringing uses."'
F. Adopting Contributory Copyright Infringement: Sony
Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417 (1984)
In 1976, Universal City Studios, Inc. ("Universal") brought an
action against Sony Corporation of America ("Sony") in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California,
alleging that Sony's Betamax video tape recorders ("VTR's") were
used to record some of Universal's copyrighted material that had
been broadcasted on television.'4 8 Furthermore, Universal claimed
that Sony was liable for the Betamax consumer's alleged
infringement because Sony marketed their recorders for use in
recording television shows and watching them at a later time.'4 9
142. Id.
143. Id. at 650.
144. Id. at 649 (citing 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 6.1.2 (2d ed.

2003)).
145.
146.
147.
148.
(1984).
149.

See id.at 649-54.
Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
Id. at 653.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420

Id. at 420.
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The District Court denied Universal's claim and ruled in favor of
Sony. 5° The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
however, reversed the lower court's decision and found Sony
liable for contributory infringement, and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari."'
Adopting the District Court's finding of fact, the Supreme Court
noted that the average person used a VTR to record a television
show and watch it at a later time, which is known as "timeshifting."' 52 It explained that this practice expanded the television
viewing audience and there was no evidence presented indicating
that time-shifting impaired the commercial value of broadcasted
copyrighted television shows or that there was a likelihood of
future harm.'53 The Court warned that if it were to affirm the
appellate court's decision, it would enlarge a copyright holder's
statutory monopoly "to encompass control over an article of
commerce that is not the subject of the copyright protection," and
such an expansion was beyond what Congress had granted.'54
The issue that was presented to the Supreme Court in Sony was
whether the sale of "copying equipment to the general public"
violated the Copyright Act.'55 Sony introduced evidence that over
80% of people surveyed watched at least as much television prior
to owning a VTR, and Universal offered no evidence showing a
decrease in television viewing.'56 In addition, Sony presented
evidence demonstrating that many programs, such as religious,
educational, and sports programming, could be copied without any
objection from the copyright holders.' 57
150. Id.
151. Id. at 420-21.

152. Id. at 421.
153. Id.
154. Sony, 464 U.S. at 421.
155. Id. at 420.
156. Id. at 424.
157. Id.; see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125
S.Ct. 2764, 2788 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (referencing the Brief for
Respondent Universal Studios et al. O.T. 1983, No. 81-1687, pp. 52-53, which
mentioned a survey that showed that approximately nine percent of all VTR
recordings were educational, religious, and sports programming, which were
"owned by producers and distributors testifying on Sony's behalf who did not
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As the Court noted, "[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly
'
render anyone liable for infringement committed by another."158
The Sony Court explained that this was different from the Patent
Act, which imputes vicarious liability on anyone who "actively
' and on certain parties deemed
induces infringement of a patent"159
to be "contributory"'6 ° infringers. 6 ' Although vicarious liability is
not explicit in the Copyright Act, such liability is imposed in many
areas of law.'6 2 Since this type of liability lacked precedent in
copyright law, the Court referred to patent law for an analogy.'63
The Court expressed caution in using such analogies, but
explained the close kinship between copyright and patent law,
which made such an analogy appropriate in this circumstance.' 64
The concept of contributory infringement is expressly defined in
the statute, and explicitly "provides that the sale of a 'staple article
or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing
use' is not contributory infringement."' 65 Furthermore, when
liability for contributory infringement is based solely on the sale of
an article of commerce that a purchaser uses to infringe a patent,
the public's interest in accessing that article of commerce is
implicated.' 66 The Court explained that under patent law, a remedy
for finding contributory infringement is to "give the patentee
effective control over the sale of that item," which puts the item
within the patentee's monopoly.'6 7 The Court found that the sale
of an article, which has been "adapted to an infringing use [and] is
also adapted to other lawful uses, is not enough to make the seller
object to time-shifting").
158. Sony, 464 U.S. at 434.
159. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2005).
160. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
161. Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 (interestingly, the latter form of liability was
adopted in Sony, while the inducement form of liability would be adopted nearly
twenty years later in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125
S.Ct. 2764 (2005)).
162. Id. (noting further that the concept of "contributory infringement" is a
subset of vicarious liability).
163. Id. at 439.
164. Id. at 439 n.19.
165. Id. at 440.
166. Id.
167. Sony, 464 U.S. at 440-41.
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Although there are apparent
a contributory infringer."' 68
differences between copyright and patent law, the Court
recognized that the "staple article of commerce doctrine must
strike a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand
for effective - not merely symbolic - protection of the statutory
monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially
unrelated areas of commerce."' 69 Accordingly, the sale of articles
of commerce, including the sale of copying equipment, does not
constitute contributory infringement when "the product is widely
used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes"; it need only be
capable of substantial non-infringing uses.'7
It then had to be determined whether Sony's Betamax was
capable of commercially significant non-infringing uses.' 7 ' The
Court stressed that it was not necessary to examine all the potential
uses, but only necessary to determine whether a significant number
of the uses would not infringe copyrights.' 72 Although it was not
specified how much use was commercially significant, the Court
found that the potential use of "private, noncommercial timeshifting in the home" satisfied the standard.'73 The standard was
met because Universal had "no right to prevent other copyright
holders from authorizing it for their programs, and because the
[d]istrict [c]ourt's factual findings reveal[ed] that even the
of respondents' program [was]
unauthorized home time-shifting
74
legitimate fair[-]use."1
The Court then examined authorized time-shifting and
unauthorized time-shifting. First, in its authorized time-shifting
analysis, the Supreme Court noted that within the combined
spectrum of television programming, Universal's share was well
below 10%.171 It stressed that if Universal prevailed, the outcome
would significantly impact both viewers and producers of the

168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 441.
Id.at 442.
Id.

Id.
172. Id.
173. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.

174. Id.
175. Id. at 443.
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remaining ninety percent of programming in the nation.'76
Although many producers likely shared Universal's concern of
unrestricted copying, the Court agreed with the district court that
time-shifting might increase the total viewing audience and, in
fact, many producers might be willing to permit private timeshifting to continue for an experimental time-period.' 77
Furthermore, Universal did not represent the entire class of all
copyright holders.'78
In "an action for contributory infringement against the seller of
copying equipment, the copyright holder may not prevail unless
the relief that he seeks affects only his programs, or unless he
speaks for virtually all copyright holders with an interest in the
outcome."' 7 9 In other words, a plaintiff that alleges contributory
copyright infringement will only win if he is requesting a remedy
that solely affects his product or if the plaintiffs action represents
almost every copyright holder that has an interest in the plaintiffs
litigation.
Therefore, the Court concluded that there were
numerous important producers of local and national television
programs who found nothing wrong with enlarging the size of
television audiences, which was a direct result of time-shifting for
private home use.' ° As such, it held that a distributor of
equipment that expanded producers' audiences could not be liable
for contributory infringement when the distributor was not directly
involved with any of the infringing activity.'8 '
Finally, the Court found that unauthorized time-shifting
constituted fair-use.'8 2 Specifically, although some of the uses

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 446.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 446.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 447-55; see also id. at 450 n.30
(In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair[-]use the factors to be considered shall
include - (1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
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were not authorized, the respondents failed to show that timeshifting caused a likelihood of non-minimal injury to the potential
market for the copyrighted works.'83 As such, the Supreme Court
held that Sony's Betamax was capable of substantial noninfringing uses because there were a substantial amount of
copyright holders that would authorize private viewers to timeshift the copyrighted broadcasts, and
those broadcasts that were
84
not authorized constituted fair-use.'
G. ConcurringOpinions in Grokster: "Substantial" or
"Commercially Significant" Non-Infringing Uses
Although there was a unanimous decision as to the adoption and
applicability of the inducement theory to the facts of Grokster, the
concurring opinions in Grokster are particularly important because
they expound upon the type of evidence that is sufficient for a
showing of "substantial" or "commercially significant" noninfringing uses under contributory copyright infringement.
Specifically, Justice Ginsburg's opinion suggested that anecdotal
evidence is inconsequential when determining summary judgment
for contributory infringement, urging for a more strict
interpretation of Sony.'85 In contrast, Justice Breyer explained that
the circumstances in Grokster were similar to those in Sony, and
the evidence presented would be enough for Grokster and
StreamCast to survive summary judgment.'8
1. Justice Ginsburg's Concurrence
Justice Ginsburg, joined by the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Kennedy in the concurrence, agreed with the Court's
adoption of the inducement theory of liability, but wrote separately
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107)).
183. Id. at 447-56.
184. Id. at 456.
185. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764,
2783-86 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
186. See id. at 2787-96 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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to suggest whether, under the facts of this case, the software in
question is "capable of 'substantial' or 'commercially significant'
non-infringing uses" in order to guide the Court of Appeals in
reconsidering "its interpretation of Sony's product distribution
holding," on a more complete record, if summary judgment was
not granted to MGM on remand.'87
Justice Ginsburg outlined the evidence that Grokster and
StreamCast had presented, all of which she considered to be
anecdotal evidence. She argued that much of the evidence was
from declarations that the defendants submitted, including
assertions that "authorized copyrighted works or public domain
works [were] available online and shared through peer-to-peer
'
networks."188
Ginsburg urged that Grokster's and StreamCast's
anecdotal evidence neither outweighed MGM's statistical survey
nor supported summary judgment.189 She found that "the evidence
was insufficient to demonstrate, beyond genuine debate, a
reasonable prospect that substantial or commercially significant
non-infringing uses were likely to develop over time."' 9 ° Justice
Ginsburg concluded that the district court should not have granted
summary judgment in favor of Grokster and StreamCast on the
charge of contributory infringement."
2. Justice Breyer's Concurrence
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice
O'Connor joined in the concurrence, agreed with the Court's
adoption of the inducement theory of liability, and also agreed that
187. Id. at 2783, 2787 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 2785.
189. Id. at 2785-86 (noting that general statements were made in support of
Grokster and StreamCast's position that the software was used for sharing
public domain eBooks; file-sharing impacted music sales positively; P2P
technology offers musicians an alternative channel for distribution and
promotion; "President Bush speeches" on video, and copies of the declaration of
independence and the bible were available on the networks; and these networks
offered "content owners distinct business advantages over alternate online

distribution technologies").
190. Id. at 2786.
191. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2786.
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Sony should not be revisited. 92 Breyer wrote separately, however,
to explain his disagreement with Justice Ginsburg's concurrence
on the matter of whether Grokster's software was capable of
"commercially significant" or "substantial" non-infringing uses.'93
Contrary to Justice Ginsburg's opinion, Justice Breyer believed
that the Sony opinion and the record of evidence presented in the
Grokster case was sufficient to support the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion of summary judgment based on contributory copyright
infringement. 94
Justice Breyer reiterated the abovementioned "staple article of
commerce" doctrine that was adopted in Sony.'95 He noted that "of
all the taping actually done by Sony's customers, only around 9%
was of the sort the Court referred to as authorized."' 9 6

He

emphasized that the Court considered the "magnitude of
authorized programming" presented in Sony to be "significant"
and that there was a "significant potential for future authorized
copying."' 9 7 This conclusion was based on evidentiary testimony

of professional sports league officials, a religious broadcasting
representative, a Los Angeles educational station whose programs
were made available for taping, and a widely watched children's
program called "Mr. Roger's Neighborhood."' 98 Based on this
testimony and similar evidence, the Court found that producers
had authorized duplication of their copyrighted programs "in
significant enough numbers to create a substantial market for

192. Id. at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2787-88 (noting that "the sale of copying equipment, 'like the sale
of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if
the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it
need merely be capable of substantial non[-]infringing uses') (citing Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984)).
196. Id. at 2788; Compare Id. at 2778 (majority opinion) (emphasis added)
(noting that since ninety percent of material on one of the networks was
copyrighted, MGM assumed that the remaining ten percent was non-infringing;
or in other words, authorized).
197. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2788 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Sony, 464
U.S. at 444).
198. Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 444-45).
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non[-]infringing use of the" Betamax.' 99 Breyer further explained
that the Court used the word "substantial" to specify that these
circumstances alone20 were a sufficient basis for refusing to impose
secondary liability.
In contrast to Justice Ginsburg's analysis, Justice Breyer
suggested that "[w]hen measured against Sony's underlying
evidence and analysis, the evidence before" the Grokster Court
passed Sony's test - "whether the company's product is capable of
substantial or commercially significant non[-]infringing uses. '"201
Specifically, based on the findings of MGM's own expert, 75% of
the files on Grokster were infringing and 15% were "likely
infringing," which left 10% that were not infringing.20 2 Breyer
stressed that this percentage of non-infringing material was
extremely similar to the 9% of authorized time-shifting uses of the
Betamax that was presented to the Court in Sony. 0 3 Justice Breyer
argued that MGM's offered evidence was not sufficient to create a
quantitative difference from Sony and would not survive summary
judgment." 4 He stressed that although the total number of uses of
Grokster's product was only a small percentage in quantitative
terms, this was also the case in Sony, "which characterized the
relatively limited authorized copying market as 'substantial." 2 5
Next, Justice Breyer emphasized the importance of Sony's use of
the word "capable" in determining whether the product in that case
was "capable of' substantial non-infringing uses.2 °6 Specifically,
he explained that Sony's language and analysis suggested that 10%
was a sufficient amount if there was a "reasonable prospect of
expanded legitimate use over time."2 7 He also noted that the
language in Sony indicated that it was appropriate to look at
"potential future uses of the product" when determining its
199. Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 447).
200. Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 456).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2788-89.
203. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2788-89 (Breyer, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 2789 (noting that the study showed that around 10% of the files
were apparently non-infringing).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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"capability."208
In evaluating this interpretation of Sony in light of the facts of
Grokster, Justice Breyer suggested that the record revealed "a
significant future market for non[-]infringing uses of' P2P
software.20 9 In particular, the fact that such software allowed the
transfer of any type of digital file, whether copyrighted or not,
indicated that lawful P2P file-sharing would become more
prevalent as more un-copyrighted files are stored in a digital
medium.21 ° Specifically, legitimate non-infringing P2P filesharing has come to include research information, public domain
films, historical recordings and digital education materials, news
broadcasts, and user-created audio and video files. 1 Justice
Breyer found these uses, along with the estimated 10% of nonHe
infringing uses, to be enough to meet the Sony standard.
explained that Sony 's standard seeks to protect the development of
technology generally, and not companies like Grokster who can be
found liable under the inducement theory.21 3
In order to determine whether a modification (as MGM
requested) or a more strict interpretation of Sony (as Justice
Ginsburg's approach would do in practice) should be adopted,
Justice Breyer answered three questions to determine which
approach met the appropriate balance between copyright
protection and new technology interests. 2 4 First, he found that
Sony, as he interpreted it, "has provided entrepreneurs with needed
assurance that they will be shielded from copyright liability as they
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id..
Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2789 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 2789-90.
Id. at 2790.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2791 (explaining that:
to determine whether modification, or a strict interpretation,
of Sony is needed, [Breyer asked] whether MGM has shown
that Sony incorrectly balanced copyright and new-technology
interests... in particular: (1) Has Sony.. .worked to protect new
(2) If so, would modification or strict
technology?
interpretation significantly weaken that protection? (3) If so,
would new or necessary copyright-related benefits outweigh
any such weakening?).
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bring valuable new technologies to market," thereby protecting
new technology. 1' 5 Specifically, he explained that the Sony rule is
clear, it purposely makes it difficult for courts to find secondary
liability when new technology is at issue, it is forward looking, and
it is "mindful of the limitations facing judges where matters of
technology are concerned. ' 21 6 In fact, over the last twenty years,
there have been relatively few contributory infringement lawsuits
brought against technology providers based on the product
distribution theory, which bolstered the argument that Sony had
achieved its innovation-protecting objective.2 17
Since Justice Breyer found that the Sony rule had worked to
215. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
216. Id. at 2791-92
([The] clarity allows those who develop new products that are
capable of substantial non[-]infringing uses to know, ex ante,
that distribution of their product will not yield massive
monetary liability. At the same time, it helps deter them from
distributing products that have no other real function than - or
that are specifically intended for - copyright infringement,
deterrence that the Court's holding today reinforces (by
adding a weapon to the copyright holder's legal arsenal)."
Additionally, the Sony rule "establishes that the law will not
impose copyright liability upon the distributors of dual-use
technologies (who do not themselves engage in unauthorized
copying) unless the product in question will be used almost
exclusively to infringe copyrights (or unless they actively
induce infringements)." Sony recognizes that copyright laws
are not intended to control or discourage the emergence of
new technologies. In addressing its forward looking nature,
Breyer explained that the Sony rule "does not confine its
scope to a static snapshot of a product's current uses... [and]
Sony's word "capable" refers to a plausible, not simply a
theoretical, likelihood that such uses will come to pass, and
that fact anchors Sony in practical reality."
Finally, he
explained that "Judges have no specialized technical ability to
answer questions about present or future technological
feasibility or commercial viability where technology
professionals, engineers, and venture capitalists themselves
may radically disagree and where answers may differ
depending upon whether one focuses upon the time of product
development or the time of distribution.).
217. Id. at 2792.
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protect new technology, he then evaluated whether a strict
interpretation or modification of the rule would significantly
weaken protection." Although Justice Ginsburg's more stringent
evidentiary requirement would benefit copyright holders, Breyer
believed that it would create legal uncertainty among inventors and
entrepreneurs."' Specifically, inventors and entrepreneurs would
have difficulty assessing whether they should continue creating
new technology because they would not know how a court might
later "weigh the respective values of infringing and non-infringing
uses, determine the efficiency and advisability of technological
changes, or assess a product's potential future markets."2 ' In other
words, inventors and entrepreneurs would have increased time and
development costs when creating, producing, or distributing the
type of technology that could be used for copyright
If anecdotal evidence is not allowed, these
infringement.22 1
increased costs would act as a significant disincentive for
technological innovation because in the development stages of
creating new technologies, there would be no statistics as to how a
particular product is being used and, in fact, there is only anecdotal
evidence in these early stages. Therefore, this legal uncertainty
directly affects the balance between the rights of copyright holders
and inventors.222
Finally, according to Justice Breyer, the most difficult question
to answer was "whether a positive copyright impact would
218. Id.
219. Id. (explaining that Ginsburg's "approach would require defendants to
produce considerably more concrete evidence - more than was presented here to earn Sony's shelter [and this] heavier evidentiary demand .... especially the
more dramatic (case-by-case balancing) modifications that MGM and the
Government seek...would... undercut the protection that Sony now offers").
220. Id. at 2793.
221. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
222. Id. at 2792-93
(To require defendants to provide, for example, detailed
evidence - say business plans, profitability estimates,
projected technological modifications, and so forth - would
doubtless make life easier for copyrightholder plaintiffs, [b]ut
it would simultaneously increase the legal uncertainty that
surrounds the creation or development of a new technology
capable of being put to infringing uses.).
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outweigh any technology-related loss. '223 He noted that the law
favors protecting technology and, in fact, Sony clearly articulated
that when liability is imposed on "the producer of a technology
which permits unlawful copying [and he] does not himself engage
in unlawful copying," courts must be circumspect in allowing
copyright laws to hinder distribution of new technologies.22 4
Although the Constitution provides that one should be rewarded
for his creative works in order to induce him to provide those
works to the public, the text of the Constitution does not give
guidance on how to balance the interests involved. 25 While it is
true that unauthorized copying will likely diminish industry
revenue, it is unclear to what extent production has actually
declined as a result of any reduction in revenue from such
copying. 22216 Justice Breyer noted that "there is good reason to
believe that the decline, if any, is not substantial. 227
Finally, Breyer stressed that copyright holders have other means

223. Id. at 2793 ("[Breyer did] not doubt that a more intrusive Sony test
would generally provide greater revenue security for copyright holders, [b]ut it
[would] be harder to conclude that the gains on the copyright swings would
exceed the losses on the technology roundabouts.").
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2794 (noting various studies, including the Informa Media Group
Report's estimate that "total lost sales to the music industry [was] in the range
of $2 billion annually," and an academic study by F. Oberholzer & K. Strumpf
that concluded that "file[-]sharing has no statistically significant effect on
purchases of the average album") (citing Informa Media Group Report, supra
note 21; Oberholzer, supra note 21.
227. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2794 (referring to a report by M. Madden which
found that "nearly 70% of musicians believe that file[-]sharing is a minor threat
or no threat at all to creative industries," and a Yale Law Review article by
Yochai Benkler that said, "[m]uch of the actual flow of revenue to artists - from
performances and other sources - is stable even assuming a complete
displacement of the CD market by peer-to-peer distribution.. .It would be silly to
think that music, a cultural form without which no human society has existed,
will cease to be in our world [because of illegal file swapping]") (citing M.
Madden, Artists, Musicians and the Internet, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE
PROJECT, at http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIP-Artists.MusiciansReport.pdf
(Dec. 5, 2004); Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the
Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 Yale L.J.
273,351 (2004)).
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available to reduce piracy and to minimize any threat it poses to
creative production.228 Specifically, the newly adopted inducement
rule allows copyright holders to sue a "technology provider where
a provable specific intent to infringe... is present."22 9 Moreover,
copyright holders have always had the legal authority to bring a
lawsuit under a direct infringement theory against those who
wrongfully copied protected works.23 In fact, such suits in the
context of file-sharing have been successful in reducing the
amount of piracy on P2P networks.2 1' Furthermore, copyright
holders can develop new technological devices to help curb
unlawful infringement, such as "digital watermarking" and "digital
fingerprinting," which can help expose infringers by encoding data
within the digital file that will provide232"information about the
author and the copyright scope and date.
In addition to technological advances that could help prevent
copyright infringement, Breyer also noted that technological
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 2794-95 ("[S]ince September 2003, the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA) has filed 'thousands of suits against people for
sharing copyrighted material.' These suits have provided copyright holders with
damages; have served as a teaching tool, making clear that much file[-]sharing,
if done without permission, is unlawful; and apparently have had a real and
significant deterrent effect." Specifically, the "number of people downloading
files fell from a peak of roughly 35 million to roughly 23 million in the year
following the first suits; 38% of current downloaders report downloading fewer
files because of the suits.") (citing Walker, New Movement Hits Universities:
Get Legal Music, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2005, at El; L. Rainie, M. Madden, D.
Hess, & G. Mudd, The State of Music Downloading and File-Sharing Online,
PEW INTERNET PROJECT & COMSCORE MEDIA METRIX DATA MEMO, at
www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_FilesharingApril_04.pdf (Apr. 2004)).
232. Id. at 2795 (citing RIAA Reveals Method to Madness, WIRED NEWS, at
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,60222,00.html (Aug. 28, 2003));
June M. Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws & Copyright: A Report from the
Kernochan Centerfor Law, Media and the Arts, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 385
(2004)); see also id. (mentioning that certain types of "technology can, through
encryption, potentially restrict users' ability to make a digital copy") (citing J.
Tripping
the
Rippers,
at
Borland,
(Sept. 28,
http://news.com/Tripping+the+rippers/2009=1023_3=273619.html
2001)).
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advancement has discouraged infringement "by making lawful
copying (e.g., downloading music with the copyright holder's
'
permission) cheaper and easier to achieve." 233
These legal paid
services give consumers an incentive to move away from illegal
services like Grokster because they offer the same, if not more,
convenience and flexibility without the risk of being sued for
direct copyright infringement.2 34 Breyer also urged that legislation
remains a viable option.235
III. ANALYSIS: EVIDENTIARY THRESHOLDS, INTERNATIONAL
IMPLICATIONS, AND THE NEED FOR FURTHER LEGISLATION

A. Secondary Liability FrameworkAfter Grokster
The Supreme Court explicitly stated that Grokster was not about
"imputed intent," but was about intent to encourage copyright
infringement.236 As such, the Sony case did not have to be revisited
since the Court adopted the inducement theory.237 The Court held
that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Sony was erroneous, and
that evidence that a party has taken active steps to encourage direct
infringement showed an "affirmative intent that the product be
used to infringe, and a showing that infringement was encouraged
overcomes the law's reluctance to find liability when a defendant
'
merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use." 238
233. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2795 (mentioning that Walmart.com only charges
$0.88 for each song downloaded); See also All Your Greatest Hits, supra note
18.
234. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2795 (noting that the "percentage of current
downloaders who have used paid services rose from 24% to 43% in a year;
number using free services fell from 58% to 41%") (citing M. Madden & L.
Rainie,
Music &
Video Downloading Moves Beyond P2P, at
www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPFilesharing March05.pdf (Mar. 2005)).
235. Id. at 2796 ("Courts are less well suited than Congress to the task of
'accomodating fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are
inevitably implicated by such new technology."') (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984)).
236. Id. at 2778-79 (majority opinion).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 2779.
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A showing of such intent prevents a party from seeking shelter
under Sony's staple article rule. 3 9
In light of the Grokster ruling, it remains to be seen how lower
courts will approach a secondary copyright infringement case
when there is a product that has been used to infringe copyrighted
works.2 4' As the Court stated in Grokster, while Sony is limited to
imputing culpable intent based on the specific characteristics or
use of a distributed product, "nothing in Sony requires a court to
ignore actual evidence of an intent" to infringe copyrighted
material.2 41 Thus, the first step in the analysis is to determine if
there is any evidence that would demonstrate that a third-party
distributed a product and promoted its use "to infringe copyright,
as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to
2 42
foster infringement.
It is apparent from the Grokster decision that four types of
evidence, taken as a whole, are sufficient to prove inducement to
infringe a copyright: (1) advertisements for a product that directly
promote its use for acts that infringe copyright, (2) actively
recruiting the users of an existing product or service that was
found to have been used for infringing purposes, (3) failure to
develop mechanisms to prevent infringing activity, and (4)
adopting business models that are dependent upon generating
income from high-volume use of the product when the record
shows that such use is infringing. 43 Presumably, without the first
239. Id. ("Thus, where evidence goes beyond a product's characteristics or
the knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or
actions directed to promoting infringement, Sony's [staple article] rule will not
preclude liability.").
240. See David Post, The Impact of Grokster, NAT'L LAW J., Aug. 3, 2005, at
Col. 1.
241. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2779.
242. Id. at 2780. See also Post, supra note 240.
243. David Leit & Matthew Savare, Much Ado About Something: Grokster
Decision Affects All Tech Companies, 181 NEW JERSEY L.J., 1013 (2005), WL

181 N.J.L.J. 828 (noting that the four types of evidence in Grokster were:
(1) both StreamCast and Grokster advertised through online
ads and newsletters that their software could access popular
copyrighted music; (2) both companies actively courted
former Napster users; (3) neither company attempted to
develop filtering tools to prevent infringing activity; and (4)
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three types of evidence, the fourth would not be sufficient, because
Grokster noted that the fourth type of "evidence alone would not
justify an inference of unlawful intent, but viewed in the context of
'
If the requisite amount
the entire record its import [was] clear."244
of evidence is shown to demonstrate inducement to use a product
for infringing purposes, then a third-party will be held secondarily
liable for copyright infringement.245 Grokster provides the higher
evidentiary extreme because there was overwhelming evidence
that Grokster and StreamCast encouraged users to use its product
toward infringement of copyrighted music. Following Grokster,
however, district courts will develop the lower evidentiary extreme
because there likely will be cases that will not have the abundance
of evidence that was presented in Grokster, and it will be a closer
call as to whether or not the company has the requisite intent under
the inducement theory of liability.
If a court finds that there is not enough evidence to show intent
to encourage copyright infringement, the extent of further analysis
is unclear. The Ninth Circuit, for example, determined that
"Napster's actual, specific knowledge of direct infringement
render[ed] Sony's holding of limited assistance to Napster." '4 6 As
such, the Napster Court evaluated Napster's contributory liability
based on whether it had "knowledge of the infringing activity,
induce[ed], cause[d] or materially contribute[d] to the infringing
conduct of' its users.2 47 Some scholars have suggested that the
courts' next step after considering Grokster's inducement theory
the business model of both companies [was] predicated on
advertising revenue, which [was] driven by high-volume use
of their software).
244. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2769.
245. Post, supra note 240.
246. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir.
2001) (explaining that it was departing "from the reasoning of the district court
that Napster failed to demonstrate that its system is capable of commercially
significant uses." Instead, the appellate court relied on Technology Center v.
Netcom On-Line Communications Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1371
(N.D. Cal. 1995), "which suggests that in an online context, evidence of actual
knowledge of specific acts of infringement is required to hold a computer
system operator liable for contributory copyright infringement").
247. Id. at 1019 (citing Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt.,
Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
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should be to evaluate liability under Napster, determining whether
there was actual knowledge of specific infringements and whether
the third-party distributor had the capability to stop those
infringements.248 Specifically, the Napster Court noted that in
Sony, liability rested on whether Sony had "sold equipment with
constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers may use
that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted
249
'
material."
As such, the Sony Court refused to "impute the
requisite level of knowledge where the defendants made and sold
equipment capable of both infringing and substantial noninfringing uses."25
The Napster Court did not "impute the
requisite level of knowledge" based solely on the fact that P2P
"'
technology might be used to infringe copyrighted works.25
Ultimately, one of the bases for its decision rested in finding that
Napster had actual knowledge of specific infringing material,252
without regard to whether or not Napster was utilized for
substantial non-infringing uses. District courts in the Ninth Circuit
have followed this framework.253
Other jurisdictions, however, have rejected "actual knowledge"
as a sufficient condition for contributory copyright infringement.
The Seventh Circuit, for example, has indicated that it does not
agree with the Ninth Circuit's suggestion "that actual knowledge
of specific infringing uses is a sufficient condition for deeming
[that] a facilitator [is] a contributory infringer. '254 The Seventh
248. Post, supra note 240 (Professor David Post has indicated that the
Napster analysis is the next step in determining secondary liability after a court
finds that there is no encouragement to infringe under Grokster); see also Leit &
Savare, supra note 242.
249. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) (emphasis added)).

250. Id.
251. Id. at 1020-21 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436).
252. Id. at 1021-22.
253. See, e.g., Marvel v. NCSoft Corp., No. CV 04-9253RGKPLAX, 2005
WL 878090 (C.D.Cal Mar. 9, 2005).
254. In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003)
(agreeing "with Professor Goldstein that the Ninth Circuit erred in [Napster] in
suggesting that actual knowledge of specific infringing uses is a sufficient
condition for deeming a facilitator a contributory infringer") (citing Paul
Goldstein, COPYRIGHT § 6.1.2 (2d ed. 2003)).
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Circuit agreed with Sony's reasoning that prevention of copyright
infringement "effectuated by means of a new technology" should
not come at a price of potentially denying non-infringing
consumers the benefits of technology. 55 Relying only on actual
knowledge, and not considering whether there were substantial
non-infringing uses would clearly deny consumers the benefit of
the technology because such a limited analysis does not consider
the benefit that the technology has to society, thereby ignoring the
need to balance the interests of innovators and copyright holders.
The Seventh Circuit relied, instead, on whether the alleged thirdparty infringer's product had probable, not possible, substantial
non-infringing uses - a reliance on the Sony rule.256 In fact, the
Supreme Court left the question open as to when liability can rest
solely "on distribution with knowledge that unlawful use will
'
In other words, the question as to whether a distributor
occur."257
of a product can be held liable solely on the fact that it knows that
the product will be used primarily for unlawful use is an issue that
the Supreme Court might resolve in the future.258
Whether or not the Napster Court's view that actual knowledge
is a sufficient condition gets adopted among different jurisdictions,
the next step is to determine whether a product is "capable of
substantial non-infringing use" under Sony.2 59 In determining this
standard, the Sony Court explained that it is not necessary for all
potential uses of a product to be explored to determine whether
there is contributory infringement, but rather only a significant
number of uses need to be found non-infringing.2 6 ° The Court,
however, did not define how much is considered commercially
255. Id.
256. Id. at 653 (noting that the question is not whether non-infringing uses
are possible, but whether they are probable, and that it is not enough "that a
product or service be physically capable.. .of a non-infringing use").
257. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764,

2778 (2005).
258. Cf id. ("MGM [urged] the Court [to] quantify [Sony] to the extent of
holding that a product sued 'principally' for infringement does not qualify"

under the Sony rule.)
259. Post, supra note 240.
260. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984).
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significant.26 '

Twenty years later, the Grokster Court refused to answer this
question once again. Specifically, MGM asked the Court to find
that a product that is used "principally" for infringement would not
qualify under the "substantial non-infringing use" standard.262
MGM's statistical evidence explained that only 10% of the files
available on one of the networks were not copyrighted, and this
should not constitute a "substantial" non-infringing use.263

The

Supreme Court, however, limited its holding to the appellate
court's erroneous misinterpretation of Sony, thereby refusing to
quantify what constitutes a "substantial" non-infringing use.2 "
Although the Supreme Court did not answer this question, the
issue was debated in the two concurring opinions of Grokster.
Justice Ginsburg argued that the evidence presented on behalf of
Grokster and StreamCast was anecdotal evidence and insufficient
to survive summary judgment under Sony on a claim of
contributory infringement.265 In contrast, Justice Breyer argued
that since approximately 9% of all VTR recordings were
authorized uses and met the Sony standard, then the 10% of the
files shared on the network in Grokster also met the Sony
standard.266 Obviously, interpretation of what constitutes a
"substantial" non-infringing use under Sony is an issue that will
continue to plague lower courts after Grokster.
Therefore, although there is a predictable framework as to how
lower courts will approach secondary copyright infringement, it is
unclear as to what evidentiary standards are required to find
inducement under Grokster and "substantial non-infringing use"
for contributory infringement under Sony. This lack of clarity
leaves legal uncertainty for inventors and entrepreneurs. 67 In
Grokster, the two file-sharing companies' conduct clearly
encouraged their users to download copyrighted material, giving
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id.
Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2778 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 2778-79.
Id. at 2783-87 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. at 2789 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 2792-93.
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lower courts a high evidentiary extreme as a guidepost in making
their decisions. It is unclear, however, how the lower courts will
handle cases 268where a "defendant's behavior is less than
'mistakable.'
In other words, Grokster presented a blatant case
of an entity encouraging copyright infringement, but lower courts
will have to evaluate what the baseline amount of evidence is to
deem someone liable of encouraging copyright infringement.
Likewise, although not binding on lower courts, the concurring
opinions in Grokster have blurred the evidentiary standard for
contributory liability under Sony. Moreover, the type of evidence
that is sufficient to demonstrate a "substantial non-infringing use"
is called into question because now it is uncertain whether the
Sony rule allows anecdotal evidence.
The lack of clarity presented after the Grokster decision as to the
level of evidence required to find secondary liability for copyright
infringement is particularly troublesome given the remedies in
copyright law. 69 Specifically, copyright law does not require a
showing of actual damages.27 Instead, it allows a court to award
statutory damages of anywhere between $750 and $30,000 per
work infringed.27' This potential threat of liability might have a
chilling effect on inventors.2 72 In a digital age, legal uncertainty
can be a huge deterrent for inventors. In Grokster, for example,
millions of programs were downloaded and billions of files were
shared.2 73 If there is uncertainty as to potential liability when
268. Stephen W. Feingold et al., Secondary LiabilityAfter MGM v. Grokster,
METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Sept. 5, 2005, at Col. 1, WL 9/05 METCC 12, (col.

1).
269. Fred von Lohmann, Supreme Court Didn't Help in Remedying
Uncertainty in Grokster, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV., July 27, 2005, at 10, WL

7/27/2005 MIAMIDBR 10.
270. ld; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 394 (7th ed. 1999) (defining
actual damages as "[a]n amount awarded to a complainant to compensate for a
proven injury or loss; damages that repay actual losses").
271. von Lohmann, supra note 269; See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 397
(7th ed. 1999) (defining statutory damages as "[d]amages provided by
statute.. .as distinguished from damages provided under common law").
272. von Lohmann, supra note 269.
273. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764,
2772 (2005) (majority opinion) (noting that since "well over 100 million copies
of the software in question are known to have been downloaded, and billions of
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developing technology, then it will be difficult for inventors to
account for future costs of litigation when they are evaluating
whether the expenses associated with their technological
innovation would outweigh their projected profits.274 For example,
a technology that could provide the means for copyright
infringement on a mass scale could lead to statutory damages that
are impossible to ascertain at the time of development, even
though such a use was not the purpose for which the inventor had
envisioned his product. As such, the possible damages for
distributing such a potentially infringing product are astronomical,
and legal uncertainty in this area is a major disincentive for
technological innovation.
B. FutureImpact on Secondary Liability Cases

1. Impact of Grokster on Pending Cases
The decision in Grokster will have a profound effect on pending
cases because it will change the approach that parties take in
arguing cases, as well as how courts decide those cases.275 In
Marvel v. NCSofi, for example, Marvel sued NCSoft based on
files are shared across the FastTrack and Gnutella networks each month, the
probable scope of copyright infringement is staggering").
274. Cf id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring)

(Inventors and entrepreneurs (in the garage, the dorm room,
the corporate lab, or the boardroom) would have to fear (and

in many cases endure) costly and extensive trials when they
create, produce, or distribute the sort of information
technology that can be used for copyright infringement. They
would often be left guessing as to how a court, upon later

review of the product and its uses, would decide when
necessarily rough estimates amounted to sufficient evidence.
They would have no way to predict how courts would weigh

the respective values of infringing and non[-]infringing uses;
determine the efficiency and advisability of technological
changes; or assess a product's potential future markets.).
275. Leit & Savare, supra note 243 (noting that Grokster "will certainly have

an impact on pending cases such as the Marvel v. NcSoft case" (emphasis
added)).
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contributory copyright infringement.2 76 In that case, "Defendants
NCSoft Corp., Cryptic Studios Inc., and NC Interactive Inc.,
produce[d] and distribute[d] 'City of Heroes,"' which is described
as a "massively multiplayer online game. '277 This game allows
users "to create customized characters called 'Heroes,"' with
whom the users can interact with the characters of other players.27
Marvel contended that the defendants "created, marketed,
distributed and hosted a computer game that allow[ed] players to
play online and create characters that are virtually identical in
name, appearance, and characteristics to characters owned by"
Marvel, including Captain America, Iron Man, The Incredible
Hulk, Magneto, and The Thing, to which Marvel alleged they held
valid registered copyrights.27 9 Among other claims, Marvel alleged
contributory copyright infringement.28 °
Although it was
uncontested that the game had a substantial non-infringing use to
invoke Sony, Marvel alleged that the "[d]efendants knew or should
have known" that many online players were directly infringing
Marvel's copyrights.8
Under Napster, Marvel claimed that the Defendants, "as
operators of their online computer server system," were aware of
the infringing material and failed to remove it.28 2 NCSoft filed a
motion to dismiss, relying on Sony and Napster "for the
proposition that the contributory infringement count cannot be
sustained because the game is capable of a 'substantial noninfringing use' - the creation of other online 'heroes' that do not
resemble Marvel characters. ' 28 3 The United States District Court
for the Central District of California, however, denied the motion
to dismiss and found that Marvel had stated a valid claim for

276. Id.
277. 22 No. 23 ANDREWS COMPUTER & INTERNET LITIG. REP. 8 (2005), WL
22 No. 23 ANCOMPILR 8.
278. Id.
279. Marvel Enterprises, Inc. v. NCSoft Corp., CV 04-9253RGKPLAX,
2005 WL 878090, *1-2 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
280. Id. at *2-3.
281. Id. at *3.
282. Id.
283. Leit & Savare, supra note 243.
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contributory copyright infringement.284
In light of Grokster, however, each party could address
additional claims. If Marvel argues that the defendants actively
encouraged its users to engage in copyright infringement under the
Grokster inducement theory and the Sony safe harbor was an issue,
then the defendants "cannot rely solely on the fact that the game is
capable of a substantial non-infringing use to render itself immune
'
from liability."285
For Marvel to make this argument, however, it
has to establish enough evidence to show that the defendants
"provided software tools that enable the creation" of characters to
which Marvel owned the copyright, and actively encouraged its
users to create those characters.286 Since Grokster has only
demonstrated one evidentiary extreme needed to establish
inducement to infringe a copyright, it will be cases like Marvel
that will flesh-out the inducement theory doctrine when the
plaintiffs are determining whether they have enough evidence to
proceed with a claim based on inducement. It remains to be seen
what level of evidence lower courts will find sufficient to meet the
Grokster standard.

Since Marvel is proceeding in the Ninth Circuit, and it is
uncontested that the game has a substantial non-infringing use,287 it
is unlikely that this will be the case that will help resolve the
Supreme Court's apparent disagreement over what constitutes a
"substantial" non-infringing use, as illustrated in the Grokster
concurrences.
Had this case arisen in the Seventh Circuit,
however, the outcome might have been different. Since it was
uncontested that there were substantial non-infringing uses (which
indeed were probable rather than merely possible), then courts in
that jurisdiction would not find that knowledge of the user's
creation of Marvel Superheroes would be a sufficient condition for
contributory liability. Thus, Marvel could only allege secondary
284. Marvel, 2005 WL at *3.
285. Leit & Savare, supra note 243.
286. Id. (suggesting that "Marvel cannot rely solely on the fact that NCSoft

[sic] has provided software tools that enable the creation of allegedly infringing
characters, and 'turned a blind eye' to infringing characters on the system,
without demonstrating that NCSoft [sic] has actively encouraged the creation of

infringing characters").
287. Marvel, 2005 WL at *3.
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liability based on vicarious liability or inducement theory, and
could not bring a contributory infringement claim because it was
uncontested that the product had a substantial non-infringing use.
2. File-SharingProducts Under the Facts of Sony
The threshold to show "substantial non-infringing uses" will
become important in those instances where companies do not
blatantly encourage their product users to infringe copyrights.
Many future cases likely will involve new technologies, such as
file-sharing and mass direct infringement via the Internet.
Consider a scenario similar to the facts in Sony, but which
incorporates the type of technology in Grokster. Suppose, for
example, a company distributed software called "Minster," which
instead of being downloaded for free, it was distributed into
commerce just as Sony distributed its Betamax recorders. In this
scenario, the software company would gain all of its income from
the sale of Minster itself, rather than from advertisements like
those in Grokster. Unlike Grokster, this type of incomegenerating device is not dependent on the amount of files
downloaded and the degree to which its software is actually used,
but is limited to the price and quantity of programs sold. 8'
Therefore, the software company is not directly increasing their
revenue from the volume of material that its users are
downloading.
Moreover, assume that the company encourages the use of
Minster for non-infringing uses, and takes steps to advertise to
specific groups, such as local bands, aspiring film makers, etc., as
a program that could easily distribute their creative works. Such a
fact scenario is directly opposite to that of Grokster because
Minster would not be focused on gaining a previous market of
known copyright infringers, which the Supreme Court noted was a
factor that indicated a "principal, if not exclusive, intent" to
288. Cf Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct.
2764, 2781-82 (2005) (explaining that "the more the software is used, the more
the ads are sent out and the greater the advertising revenue becomes.. .Since the
extent of the software's use determines the gain to the distributors, the
commercial sense of their enterprise turns on high-volume use").
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encourage infringement.2" 9 In addition, like in Sony, assume that

Minster expressly warns its users against downloading infringing
material in its software's user manual,29 ° and there is no internal
communication which indicates the company's actual purpose of
encouraging users to download copyrighted material.2 9'
Furthermore, assume that Minster had implemented available
preventative measures to minimize infringing activity, such as a
filtering system or digital watermarking.2 92
Nevertheless, despite these efforts, suppose Minster users
download copyrighted material using their software. Given these
circumstances, this situation does not fall squarely under the
inducement theory set forth in Grokster.293 Therefore, depending
on the jurisdiction, when determining contributory liability, a court
would have to determine if there was actual knowledge of specific
289. Cf id. at 2781 (explaining that both Grokster and StreamCast aimed:
to satisfy a known source of demand for copyright
infringement, the market comprising former Napster
users... [and their] efforts to supply services to former Napster
users, deprived of a mechanism to copy and distribute what
were overwhelmingly infringing files, indicate a principal, if
not exclusive, intent on the part of each to bring about
infringement).
290. Cf Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
459 (1984) (noting that although Sony's Betamax advertising never contained
warnings against copyright infringement, a warning did appear in the Betamax
operating instructions).
291. Cf Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2781 (noting that in StreamCast's case there
was additional evidence of "internal communications and advertising designs
aimed at Napster users," which indicated an unlawful purpose).
292. Cf id. (noting that "neither company attempted to develop filtering tools
or other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity" for which their
software was used); But cf id. n. 12 (explaining that "in the absence of other
evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find contributory infringement
liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent
infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of substantial non[-]infringing
uses [because such] a holding would tread too close to the Sony safe harbor").
293. Cf Id. at 2781-82 (explaining that each company advertised to a market
of known copyright infringers, failed to implement preventative measures to
minimize infringing use of their product, and increased their profitability based
on the amount of material that was downloaded, most of which was
copyrighted).
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instances of infringement, the capability to prevent infringement,
and whether the product had a "substantial" non-infringing use that
would trigger the Sony safe harbor.
If this scenario arose in the Ninth Circuit, then actual knowledge
would be a sufficient condition for contributory liability. In
Napster, the court found that Napster had knowledge of the
infringing use of its software because "Napster had actual
knowledge that specific infringing material was available using its
'
system."294
Evidence that Napster's co-founder had mentioned
"the need to remain ignorant of users' real names and IP addresses
'since they are exchanging pirated music"' in a document, and the
Recording Industry Association of America's ("RIAA")
notification to Napster that it had approximately 12,000
copyrighted files on its network, was sufficient to show actual
knowledge."'

Assuming that there were no documents demonstrating
knowledge of copyright infringement, the nature of the Minster
file-sharing scenario is a much weaker case for contributory
liability under Napster. If RIAA were to notify Minster's
distributors that a search on the Minster network turned up over
12,000 copyrighted files, then the issue would then be whether
Minster knew about this infringement and whether it had the
capability to block system access of those users who were
supplying infringing material. As such, the court would then have
to decide whether Minster had the "capability" to prevent users
from downloading copyrighted material.
Since file-sharing
technology no longer uses a centralized server,296 it is questionable
whether Minster would have the same capability as Napster to
prevent infringing downloads. As such, the court would have to
examine the current technology, and determine if this term meant
"capable" of rectifying the situation as it stood at the time or

294. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir.
2001).
295. Id. at 1020 n.5.
296. Cf Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2770 (noting that Grokster and StreamCast's
software allowed "computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer
networks, so called because users' computers communicate directly with each
other, not through central servers").
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"capable" of adopting additional measures to minimize copyright
infringement because, given this hypothetical scenario, it is not
clear whether Minster would be able to block users.
Assume, for whatever reason, Minster was found to be incapable
of remedying the copyright infringing use of its product. In this
case, Minster would have actual and specific knowledge of
infringement based on RIAA's notification, but would not be
capable of remedying the situation and, therefore, could not
remove the material. This situation illustrates a variation on the
issue that the Supreme Court left open in Grokster. Specifically,
MGM wanted the Court to hold "that a product used 'principally'
for infringement" should be held liable "solely on distribution with
knowledge that unlawful use will occur" when using the
product. 97 At this point, it seems that based on the statistics in
Napster98 and Grokster,299 P2P software could be considered to be
a product that is primarily used for copyright infringement. In the
Minster hypothetical, however, Minster merely had knowledge
that its software will be used for infringing purposes. Thus, this is
the type of situation that could come before the Supreme Court
which would answer whether secondary liability can be based
solely on the distribution of a product with knowledge that
infringing activity will occur.
If the Minster scenario arose in the Seventh Circuit, however, it
297. Id. at 2778-79 (explaining that MGM asked that where there is only
10% non-infringing use, it should be deemed as a product used "principally" for
infringement and should not qualify as "substantial" under Sony, and noting that
the Supreme Court would "not revisit Sony further... to add a more quantified
description of the point of balance between protection and commerce when
liability rests solely on distribution with knowledge that unlawful use will

occur").
298. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013 (noting that "as much as eighty-seven percent
of the files available on Napster may [have been] copyrighted and more than
seventy percent may [have been] owned or administered by plaintiffs").
299. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2786 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting a
statistical survey that "identified 75% of the files available through Grokster as
copyrighted works owned or controlled by the plaintiffs, and 15% of the files as
works likely copyrighted.. .[and as] to the remaining 10% of the files, 'there was
not enough information to form reasonable conclusions either as to what those
files even consisted of, and/or whether they were infringing or noninfringing"').
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would follow the analysis of Aimster, which also considered
substantial non-infringing uses, and declined to adhere to the Ninth
Circuit's finding that "knowledge of specific infringing uses is a
sufficient condition for deeming a facilitator a contributory
In other words, the court would still consider
infringer.""3 '
whether the defendant fell under the Sony safe harbor, and if there
was such a showing, then a defendant could escape contributory
liability despite a showing of actual knowledge. In the Seventh
Circuit, it must be shown that the non-infringing uses are probable
and not just possible in order to fall under the Sony rule. The
Aimster Court outlined five potential non-infringing uses for which
Aimster, however,
the file-sharing service could be used.'
presented no evidence that its software had been used for a noninfringing use.3"2
At the appellate court level in Grokster, the Ninth Circuit
analyzed the Sony decision differently than the Seventh Circuit in
Aimster. The Sony Court held that "the sale of copying equipment,
like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute
contributory infringement if the product is widely used for
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be
capable of non[-]infringing uses."30 3 In its amicus brief, the
American Intellectual Property Law Association ("AIPLA") urged
the Supreme Court to resolve the ambiguities presented in Sony
300. In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003)

(explaining that the Seventh Circuit disagrees with the Ninth Circuit's
suggestion that "actual knowledge of specific infringing uses is a sufficient
condition for deeming a facilitator a contributory infringer").
301. Id. at 652-53 (noting that (1) not all of the shared music is copyrighted,
suggesting that, for example, start-up bands might waive copyright protection to
promote their music, (2) the file-sharing service "might increase the value of a

recording by enabling it to be used as currency in the music-sharing community,
since someone who only downloads and never uploads, thus acting as a pure
free rider, will not be very popular," (3) "buddy" groups might use the service to
exchange information about popular music, (4) users might use the service's
encryption capability for privacy to send non-copyrighted dirty pictures or
jokes, and (5) if a user owns a CD, but is out of town without access to it, then
the service might be used to download a copy, which might constitute fair-use).
302. Id. at 653.
303. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984).
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that lead to the different results between the Ninth Circuit in
Grokster and the Seventh Circuit in Aimster."4 It explained that
the Seventh Circuit relied on the first part of this holding as the
standard to determine whether a product "is widely used for
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes," while the Ninth Circuit
relied on the second part to preclude secondary liability when "a
product is 'merely capable' of substantial non-infringing uses."35
AIPLA further explained that "the Seventh Circuit required
evidence it did not find," while the "Ninth Circuit found evidence
it did not need."3 6 In concluding its brief, AIPLA expressed the
need to reconcile the split as to whether the standard was "mere
capability" or "wide use" because it leads to confusion and
uncertainty in certain sectors of the economy. 7 Specifically, it
articulated that it is imperative that copyright holders have
"protection from rampant infringement of their works," while
"software and equipment suppliers need predictable boundaries for
the marketing of lawful products."3"'
In its petition for certiorari,the respondents in Grokster shared
the same concerns as AIPLA as to the split between the Ninth and
Seventh Circuits and urged the Supreme Court to "clarify the
principles of secondary copyright liability applicable to peer-topeer services that facilitate copyright infiingement."3 °9
Specifically, MGM asked the Court to revisit Sony in order to
specify a quantifiable "description of the point of balance between
protection and commerce when liability rests solely on distribution
with knowledge that unlawful use will occur."31 In addition, in
terms of what constitutes a substantial non-infringing use, MGM
argued that only 10% of the files on one of the networks were not
infringing copyrights, and such an amount should not qualify as
304.
at 2-3,
(2005)
305.
306.
307.
308.

Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764
(No. 04-480).
Id at 5.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id.

309. Writ of Certiorari,supranote 24, at 25; see also id. at 14.
310. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764,
2778 (2005).
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"substantial." 3 1' MGM also suggested that the Court should
"quantify Sony to the extent of holding that a product used
'principally' for infringement does not qualify."31 2
The Seventh Circuit required an estimate of the "magnitude" of
the infringing and non-infringing uses of a product or service to
determine contributory infringement." 3 The Seventh Circuit noted
that "the balancing of costs and benefits is necessary only in a case
in which substantial non-infringing uses, present or prospective,
are determined."3 4 In establishing that a product or service is
capable of substantial non-infringing uses, Aimster, on one hand,
provides one extreme because Aimster offered no evidence to
support that its service was used for non-infringing uses.3" 5 Sony,
on the other hand, offered the other extreme because it offered
considerable evidence of instances where its product could be used
without objection.3 6 That evidentiary threshold in Sony, however,
is in dispute among the Supreme Court. Justice Ginsburg, with
whom the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined
in concurrence, urged for a tightening of the Sony standard by not
allowing anecdotal evidence to demonstrate whether a product or
service has substantial non-infringing uses.3" 7 In contrast, Justice
Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor joined,
argued that the evidence presented, anecdotal or not, would satisfy
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. In re: Aimster Copyright Litigaiton, 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that "[w]hat is true is that when a supplier is offering a product or
service that has non[-]infringing as well as infringing uses, some estimate of the
respective magnitude of these uses is necessary for a finding of contributory
infringement").
314. Id. at 650.
315. Id. at 653 (noting that Aimster failed "to produce any evidence that its
service [had] ever been used for a non-infringing use, let alone evidence
concerning the frequency of such uses").
316. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 424
(1984) (noting that "Sony introduced considerable evidence describing
television programs that could be copied without objection from any copyright
holder, with special emphasis on sports, religious, and educational
programming").
317. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764,
2783-87 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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the Sony rule and Grokster would survive summary judgment on a
claim of contributory infringement.318 Therefore, Justice Ginsburg
would only accept evidence that factually or statistically supports
that the product is being used for the potential infringing uses.3" 9
3. InternationalImplications of TechnologicalInnovation
The global nature of the Internet promotes the technological
innovation of products and services that can be used worldwide.
Both online games and file-sharing programs, for example, allow a
massive amount of global users to either create their own
characters, like in the "City of Heroes" game, or to share files
across international borders nearly instantaneously.32 ° As seen
with Marvel, Grokster, and other cases, however, some advances
in technology raise copyright infringement issues.321 When these
emerging technologies use the Internet as a means to service their
users, the issue transcends national borders. This can lead to
enforcement problems because copyright law is enforced
domestically. Therefore, there are more obstacles to enforcement,
such as deciding whether the lawsuit should be pursued in the U.S.
or in a foreign country.322 Once a judgment is obtained, one must
determine whether it can be enforced locally or if it should be
3 23
enforced abroad.
The concern for international copyright enforcement was
apparent in the amicus brief of a group of parties referred to as the
"International Rights Owners" ("IRO") to the Supreme Court in
Grokster.324 The IRO was concerned about the impact of the Ninth
318. Id. at 2787-96 (Breyer, J., concurring).
319. Cf. THE AM. HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 53 (4th ed. 2002)
(defining anecdotal as "[b]ased on casual observation or indications rather than
rigorous or scientific analysis").
320. See generally Marvel v. NCSoft Corp., No. CV 04-9253RGKPLAX,
2005 WL 878090 (C.D.Cal 2005); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005).
321. See generally id.
322. Rufus Pichler, Copyright's Long Arm: Enforcing U.S. Copyrights

Abroad,24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 45, 47 (2004).
323. Id.
324. Brief of Amicus Curiae Int'l Rights Owners, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
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Circuit's decision in Grokster. Specifically, it foresaw the impact
as a disruption to the "harmonization of intellectual property law
and the development and maintenance of uniform protection of
'
Clearly, if
intellectual property rights in the international arena."325
a global economic leader such as the U.S. condoned the type of
infringement in which Grokster and StreamCast had engaged, this
would send a court-approved message to international bodies that
the United States was not willing to respect the laws of other
countries in certain circumstances.
In the context of file-sharing, direct enforcement is very difficult
because there are so many direct infringers. It is reassuring to
know, however, that other countries are taking steps to prosecute
file-sharing companies that are located abroad. In Japan, for
example, a company called Yugen Kaisha Nippon MMO was
found liable for copyright infringement in 2003 because MMO
created an index of files to download, and users transferred "and
copied files directly to each other."3'26 Similarly, two subscription
P2P services called "EzPeer" and "Kuro" in Taiwan327 faced
criminal and civil charges for encouraging their users to illegally
share copyrighted material and ignoring injunctions to stop doing

Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480) [hereinafter
Int'l Rights Owners]
([The International Rights Owners] are trade associations and
professional organizations based outside the United States,
representing hundreds of thousands of owners of copyrights
and related rights all over the world. Specifically, amici
represent record companies, producers and distributors;
musical and literary publishers; composers and authors of a
variety of protected works; rights societies; film producers
and video publishers, in more than 100 countries outside the
United States.).
325. Id. at 1.
326. Id. at 14. (noting that Yugen Kaisha Nippon MMO "operated a peer-topeer service used by approximately 42,000 persons, who collectively made
available about 80,000 files at any one time.").
327. "Kuro [was] the largest file-swapping Internet software in Taiwan with
more than 500,000 members online...'by charging each user $99 per month, the
company [was] making NT$600 million per year' off content it doesn't own."
P2P Case on Heels of Kazaa Verdict, CHINA POST, Sept. 7, 2005, 2005 WLNR
14094997.
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so. 328 The services started out "centralized" like Napster, but
eventually became "decentralized"
and used encryption
technology. 329 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Grokster,
Kuro asked the Taiwanese trial court to consider the Ninth
33 ° This is a prime example of how
Circuit's ruling in Grokster.
decisions in the United States, although not binding on other
jurisdictions, can play an influential role in other countries.
Some countries have imposed requirements that file-sharing
companies implement mechanisms to fight against uses of their
programs that infringe copyrighted works. In Australia, for
example, an Australian court ruled that Kazaa3 was in violation of
Australian music copyright laws.332 Ultimately, the court ordered
Kazaa to implement a filtering system, which would modify the
software "so that its search function would not display files with
names matching a list of copyrighted music to be supplied by the
'
industry." 33
This decision recognizes that the Australian court
328. File-Swappers Sentenced to Jail, CHINA POST, Sept. 10, 2005, 2005
WLNR 14284973
(Injunctions against Kuro and Ezpeer [had] been largely
ignored, so Taiwan.. .had to employ criminal punishments."
Although the Taiwanese "court neglected to adjudicate the
legality of P2P software, it found Kuro responsible for
encouraging its members to illegally trade copyrighted content
through advertising... In addition to NT$300,000 fines for
each of its top three executives, chairmen Chen Shou-teng
received a sentence of two years in prison while CEO James
Chen and general manager Victor Chen were each sentenced
to three years... The court also handed down a four-month
prison term to Chen Chia-hui, a member that used Kuro to
download more than 900 songs, likely setting an explosive
example for Kuro's other estimated 500,000 users...Ruby
Hsu, an attorney... in the Kuro lawsuit, said that the judgment
[brought] Taiwan up to international judicial standards.).
329. Int 7 Rights Owners, supra note 324, at 15.
330. Id.
331. Kazaa is "ranked the world's third most-popular file-sharing network."
Maria Moscaritolo, Blow to Pirates,ADVERTISER (AUSTRALIA), Sept. 7, 2005 at
Opinion 1,2005 WLNR 14011749.
332. Wayne Arnold, Australian Court Rules Kazaa Has Violated Copyrights,
NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005, at C1.
333. Id.
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realized the importance of technological innovation while
respecting the rights of copyright holders because it resorted to a
remedy that would not hinder the technology, but would minimize
copyright infringement.
Despite many countries' efforts to enforce their copyright laws
against file-sharing companies, there are plenty of other countries
where copyright laws are not enforced as vigorously, which gives
companies an economic incentive to move offshore where they can
collect high advertising costs with lower risk of litigation.334 Some
of these different attitudes towards copyright laws can be
attributed to historical views on property, which has led to less
stringent foreign intellectual property laws that are inconsistent
with those of the United States. In China, for example, ownership
has historically been a community concept rather than an
individual one.335 Although China's intellectual property laws are
relatively new, globalization has had a profound effect on Chinese
law.336 China's accession to the World Trade Organization, for
334. Dawn C. Chmielewski, Squeeze Here - and File Sharers Will Just Go
There, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 23, 2005, 2005 WLNR 14994366.
("[There is] no way to know whether WinMX, [a file-sharing company], is
taking a continental leap to escape legal entanglements in the United States. But
it underscores how easily file-swapping companies could simply move offshore,
to Russia, or Estonia or the Cayman Islands - or anyplace with little regard for
U.S. copyright laws.").
335. See Jolene Lau Marshall, Online Music Piracy: Can American Solutions
Be Exported to the People's Republic of China to ProtectAmerican Music?, 14
PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 189, 189 (2005).
336. Matt Jackson, Harmony Or Discord? The Pressure Toward Conformity
in Int'7 Copyright, 43 IDEA 607, 618 (2003)
(Copyright never developed in China, with its very different
political, religious, and social culture. Only in the last few
years has China established copyright - even though both
paper and block printing were invented in China hundreds of
years before Gutenberg's press....[T]he tradition of a
paternalistic government and the strong reverence for ancient
knowledge in China made that society less concerned about
notions of intellectual property.);
see also Wu Shulin, The Conditions of the Judicial & Admin. Protection of
Copyright in China, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 241, 247 (1998)
([P]rotection of intellectual property rights is written into the
Chinese Penal Code and other laws and regulations, China has
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instance, has encouraged China to make its intellectual property
laws stricter.337 As the movement to protect intellectual property
rights proceeds globally, the value and degree of protection of
cultural achievements will increase.338
4. The Needfor LegislationAfter Grokster
The Grokster decision presented evidentiary uncertainties for
future cases. For the newly adopted inducement theory, there is
uncertainty as to the lower threshold for finding that a company
has encouraged users of a service or product to infringe copyrights.
The other evidentiary issue that likely will come before the Court
in the future, which was the topic of dispute in Grokster's
concurring opinions, deals with the type and amount of evidence
needed to demonstrate substantial non-infringing uses under Sony.
The former evidentiary issue has more to do with developing the
doctrine of the inducement theory adopted from patent law, while
the latter is an evidentiary issue that has to do with weighing the
evidence in favor of either inventors or copyright holders. When

joined a series of international copyright conventions .... [and]
as a country with over 5,000 years of civilized history, China
has come to realize that the protection of intellectual property
rights is significant factor that contributes greatly to scientific
and technological advancement, to cultural development, to
economic prosperity, and to social progress in general.).
337. See Stacey H. Wang, Great Olympics, New China:Intellectual Property
Enforcement Steps Up to the Mark, 27 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 291,
291 (2005)
(On one hand, China's accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) promised unsurpassed access to China's
markets. On the other hand, China's reputation for being an
intellectual property black hole is not undeserved. Investors
waited eagerly as China acceded to the WTO and the attached
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
("TRIPS Agreement") with the hope that China would soon
become fertile ground for profitable technology investment.
Unfortunately, although accession-motivated changes in
intellectual property law brought China on par with the global
powers in legislation, enforcement trails far behind.)
338. Shulin, supra note 336, at 247.
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setting the threshold to determine at what point the scale tips in
favor of the inventor or the copyright holder, Congress should
legislate in order to give courts guidance. In addition, Congress
should also impose requirements for file-sharing companies to
implement standards to prevent their users from infringing
copyrights.
In doing so, Congress should consider new
technologies and remedies that international courts have imposed.
a. Inducement Theory: Developing the Evidentiary
Guideposts
The newly adopted inducement theory from Groksterneeds time
to develop into a coherent doctrine that serves to protect copyright
holders, just as the staple article of commerce doctrine needed time
to develop after it was adopted in Sony. Indeed, over the past few
years, Internet piracy has evolved into a severe threat to copyright
holders. In fact, last year Congress was considering legislation to
address this issue that would have had a similar purpose as the
Grokster inducement theory - The Intentional Inducement of
Copyright Infringement Act ("IICIA").3 39 It is unclear, however,
how Grokster will develop, but it is premature to legislate and
reconsider the IICIA at this time.34 °
Furthermore, while contributory infringement under the Sony
rule dealt with imputed intent, the inducement theory is predicated
on culpable intent because the secondary infringers are knowingly
encouraging the users of their products and/or services to infringe
on copyrights.34 1 Moreover, the inducement theory arises in cases
where there is direct evidence of unlawful intent to encourage
infringement.3 42 This type of culpability and evidence is easier for
courts to flesh out because they are determining how much
evidence is needed to show culpable intent to encourage copyright
infringement. This evidentiary weighing is a process to which

339. Copyright Infringement and File Sharing - Part 1, 109th Cong. (2005)
(testimony of Mary Beth Peters, U.S. Register of Copyrights, Copyright Office).
340. Id.
341. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764,
2778-79 (2005) (majority opinion).
342. Id. at 2779.
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courts are accustomed. As such, it is not necessary to legislate on
this issue unless such weighing of culpable evidence interferes
with properly balancing the interests of inventors and copyright
holders.
b. Sony: Findingthe Evidentiary Threshold and Allowing
Anecdotal Evidence
The evidentiary threshold dispute over Sony, however, is more
directly related to the balancing of interests and should be left to
Congress.343 Unlike the type of culpable evidence that courts
consider under the inducement theory, evidence that is considered
to determine what constitutes a "substantial" non-infringing use to
trigger the Sony safe harbor, is of a different nature. Specifically,
depending on where the threshold is set will determine whether the
constitutional scale will weigh in favor of inventors or copyright
holders. For example, Justice Ginsburg places a higher burden on
inventors to show that their product is used for "substantial" noninfringing uses. 4

In addition, she believes that anecdotal evidence

should not carry any weight when balancing the interests of
inventors and copyright holders.34 5 As Justice Breyer pointed out,
however, such an approach would lead to legal uncertainty when
entrepreneurs and inventors are developing technology.3 46 In order

to foster technological innovation, anecdotal evidence must be
allowed to prove non-infringing uses because, without such
evidence, entrepreneurs and inventors would be deterred from
proceeding forward with development of their technology.347

In fact, if anecdotal evidence was not allowed, then the outcome
of such secondary copyright litigation would come down to a
question of timing. Specifically, if a technology is released and
initially used for an infringing purpose that the developer did not
intend, enough time may not have passed for the technology to
actually be used for its intended purpose. At this point, the
343. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
344. See generally Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2783-87 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
345. Id. at 2785-86.

346. Id. at 2792-93 (Breyer, J., concurring).
347. See id. at 2793.
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copyright holder might have statistical evidence available, while
the entrepreneurs and inventors would only have anecdotal
evidence on which to rely given the early stages of the technology,
effectively eliminating a technology that would probably benefit
the public in the future.
The Sony opinion clearly supports this reasoning. Particularly,
Sony asked whether a product was "capable of' substantial noninfringing uses.34 8 As Justice Breyer explained, the language and
analysis in Sony "suggests that a figure like 10% [of noninfringing use], if fixed for all time, might well prove insufficient,
but... such a figure serves as an adequate foundation where there
'
is a reasonable prospect of expanded legitimate uses over time."349
Furthermore, Sony's language also indicated that it is appropriate
to look "to potential future uses of the product to determine its
'capability.""'3 5 The concept of whether a product is capable of
substantial non-infringing uses, by definition, requires anecdotal
evidence. As Justice Breyer explained, the Court had similar
statistical data before it in Grokster, as it did in Sony. In fact, in
both cases, the evidence of non-infringing use was close to 10%."'
The disagreement among the Court as to the type of evidence that
will be allowed to establish non-infringing uses, and what
evidentiary threshold constitutes "substantial," goes to the heart of
balancing the interests of inventors and copyright holders.
Therefore, Congress, instead of the courts, is in a better position to
weigh the interests of inventors and copyright holders, and should
invoke its power under the Constitution to legislate in order to
balance those interests, which directly relates to the evidentiary
issues involving "substantial non-infringing uses."35
348. Id. at 2789 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Cities Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 444 (1984)).
349. Id. (noting a "significant potential for future authorized copying")
(citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 444).
350. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2789 (noting that "the record reveal[ed] a
significant future market for non[-]infringing uses of Grokster-type peer-to-peer
software").
351. Id. at 2789.
352. See id. at 2796 ("Courts are less well suited than Congress to the task of
'accommodat[ing] fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are
inevitably implicated by such new technology."') (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at
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In addition to providing guidance to the courts as to what the
optimal threshold level is to sustain the appropriate balance
between inventors and copyright holders, Congress should
legislate to impose certain safeguards that would apply specifically
to file-sharing software companies. It should impose filtering
requirements similar to what the Australian court did in the Kazaa
case. This would allow music companies and artists to list their
copyrighted material on a database with the P2P software
company, and the material listed on the database will be filtered
out through search inquiries. Presumably, there might be ways to
get around such a filtering system, such as slightly altering the
name of a file so that it would not be detected. As such, Congress
should also require these companies to implement new
technologies, such as digital watermarking.353 This technology
attaches a "digital finger print" onto the specific file, which can
then be identified as copyrighted material.354 Such technology has
431)).
353. Samuel Lewis, Digital Watermarks A Gift From the Greeks to IP
Owners, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REv., Aug. 17, 2005 at 11
(D]igital watermarks [are] a combination of ancient coding
concepts and modem technology." Specifically, they are a
modem version of ancient art of steganography, which is "a
form of encryption where a message is hidden inside another
message." The earliest form of such encoding is found in the
histories of Herodotus and had described how to conceal a
message in a wax-covered tablet. This historic form of
watermarking involved removing wax from a tablet; writing a
message on wood beneath; and re-covering the wood with
wax, making the tablet blank to anyone that did not know that
the message was under the wax. Likewise, a copyright owner
can apply the digital watermark to a file without a perceptible
change to the file.
The digital version of traditional
watermarks, which are used to prevent counterfeiting of
money and bank checks, allows information to be embedded
in electronic files such as music and movies.);
see also THE AM. HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 648 (4th ed. 2002)
("[Herodotus was known] as 'the Father of History.' [He was a] 5th cent. B.C.
Greek historian whose writing are the earliest known examples of narrative
history.").
354. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2793 (noting that new technology such as "digital
watermarking" encodes information, within the digital file, "about the author
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already been used to catch copyright infringers. 3" In fact, there are
services that will track the digital watermarks online.356
This technology can be used to identify both the owner of a file
and the "distributor or end-user of an electronic file. 3 57 Artists
that create works that can be transferred to a digital medium
should implement such technology. Musicians, for example,
should apply digital watermarks to the digital files on their
compact discs so that when the file is transferred to a computer, it
takes the mark with it wherever it goes. In the context of filesharing, Congress should require that file-sharing companies
implement digital watermarking technology so that their programs
can identify whether or not an electronic file has a digital
watermark. If the file does not have such a mark, then the program
would embed a digital watermark on the file so that it could be
Therefore, Congress's
tracked if a copyright dispute arose.
implementation of such a requirement, along with filtering systems
such as the one implemented in the Kazaa case, would greatly
minimize copyright infringement with file-sharing programs, but
would also allow the technology to thrive.

and the copyright scope and date," which can assist in identifying direct
infringers).
355. RIAA Reveals Method to Madness, supra note 232 ("[T]he Recording
Industry Association of America examined song files on [a Brooklyn woman's]
computer and traced their digital fingerprints back to the former Napster filesharing service," thereby identifying her for allegedly sharing almost 1,000
songs over the Internet. The RIAA's investegators can compare "fingerprints of
music files on a person's computer against its library [of digital fingerprints],
[and] the RIAA belives it can determine in some cases whether someone
recorded a song from a legally purchased CD or downloaded it from someone
else over the Internet." In addition, "[t]he recording industry also disclosed that
it [has begun] examining so-called 'metadata' tags, [which are] hidden snippets
of information embedded within many MP3 music files.").
356. Lewis, supra note 353 ("The power of digital watermarks is that they
can be tracked online. For a yearly fee, copyright owners now can use such
automated services to detect unauthorized uses of their copyrighted material."
One such service provider is Digimarc Corporation, based out of Oregon, which
provides many digital watermark solutions, "including a service that scans more
than 50 million Web pages every month to determine whether and where
digitally watermarked images are being used.").
357. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The Grokster decision was a victory for copyright holders
because it added another theory of liability (inducement) to protect
them from infringement. There is uncertainty, however, where the
evidentiary guideposts will be set in the lower courts. Certainty in
this area of law will develop over time as the case law develops.
As such, it is unnecessary at this stage to legislate on the
inducement issue unless it is determined that waiting for its
development will create further imbalance between the interests of
inventors and copyright holders.
In contrast, the disagreement in the Supreme Court, as to the
type and threshold of evidence that is sufficient, is more of a
pressing matter. This uncertainty among the Court directly affects
the balancing of interests between inventors and copyright holders,
which the Constitution directly grants Congress the power to
regulate. Therefore, Congress should create legislation in order to
guide courts as to what type of evidence is sufficient under the
Sony standard, and how much evidence is necessary to
demonstrate that there is a "substantial non-infringing use" which
would trigger the Sony safe harbor. Furthermore, it is clear that
copyright law has a global impact and many countries look to the
United States for guidance. Likewise, the U.S. should consider the
technologies that foreign courts have required file-sharing
companies to use, such as filtering systems, that are focused on
minimizing copyright infringement without impeding the
development of technology. Until Congress addresses these
issues, it will be difficult for inventors to foster the many gifts that
technology brings to society, while at the same time protecting
copyright holders from the dangers that can come with advances in
technology.
Shane Nix
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